

# The Rise of International Parliamentary Institutions? Conceptualization and First Empirical Illustrations

---

*ECPR Joint Sessions, Salamanca, 10-15 April 2014*

Jofre Rocabert, Frank Schimmelfennig, Thomas Winzen (ETH Zurich)

Contact: jofre.moreno@eup.gess.ethz.ch

## **Abstract**

This paper presents new research on the institutionalization and authority of international parliamentary institutions (IPIs). We seek to contribute to the research on transnational representation by proposing new empirically-based theories on the conditions under which IPIs emerge and deepen their authority. In order to do so we propose a definition of IPIs and conceptualize three dimensions along which they vary in nature: constitutional status, institutional authority and institutionalization. Based on these concepts we design the collection of a time series cross sectional database of 60 IPIs, of which we discuss the operationalization and show selected descriptive results.

## **Introduction: Why study International Parliamentary Institutions?**

There is broad agreement in the literature that the transfer of policy-making authority to international organizations produces a representative or parliamentary deficit. Whereas institutionalized international cooperation is not necessarily detrimental to democracy as such – it strengthens the policy-making capacity and efficiency of democracies and helps mitigate the negative externalities of democratic decisions in one country on democratic decisions in other countries (Keohane et al. 2009; Zürn 2000) – parliaments are regarded as losers of internationalization. They are often side-lined in international negotiations, limited to rubber-stamping international deals struck by national governments, and constrained in their national legislation by international agreements. International organizations generally consist of decision-making bodies made up of national executives and technocratic secretariats charged with preparing and implementing international agreements. Parliamentary bodies are, however, expendable and at best “nice-to-have” components of international organizations. It seems to be taken for granted that the rise of international governance is accompanied by the decline of parliament.

The real or anticipated decline of parliament has triggered several kinds of responses. First, national parliaments have reasserted their oversight capacities and rights regarding international decision-making (e.g. Martin 2000) – there is by now a burgeoning literature on the strengthening of national parliaments in European Union affairs (e.g. Auel and Raunio 2014; Winzen 2012, 2013). To a minor extent, national parliaments have also developed instruments of mutual exchange and cooperation (e.g. Slaughter 2004). Second, alternative forms of citizen representation have been theorized and in some sort put in practice. Ideas of “stakeholder democracy”, civil society fora, and NGO consultation belong to this second response (e.g. Keohane 2006; Böhmelt et al. 2013). Third, there has been movement towards the parliamentarization of international organizations, i.e. the establishment of parliamentary bodies and the growth of parliamentary competencies and activities within international organizations. It is this third response that we seek to map.

Among all international parliamentary institutions (IPIs), the European Parliament (EP) has attracted most scholarly attention. The EP is clearly the outlier among IPIs. It is directly elected, possesses extensive co-decision powers in EU legislation and the EU budget, and it can reject or censure the President and the members of the European Commission – the EU’s international “executive”. For a long time, a large part of the literature has treated the EP as a parliament among other (national) parliaments and has applied the conventional tools and theories of parliamentary and legislative analysis to the EP (e.g. Hix et al. 2007).

We are, however, more interested in comparing the EP to other IPIs. For this comparison, the starting point is not the current powers, functioning and legislative politics of the EP but its trajectory from an indirectly elected, consultative assembly as designed in the founding treaties of the EU to the EP we know now. The beginnings of the “Parliamentary Assembly”, as it was called then, resemble other existing IPIs much more closely than the current EP, and its development over time might tell us something about the conditions of parliamentarization beyond the EU. Research on the development of the EP has produced several explanations worth exploring in other regional and organizational contexts and likely to be enriched and improved by way of comparison with other IPIs.

Explanations of parliamentarization in the EU start from the assumption that the parliamentarization of international organizations is a puzzle for realist or intergovernmentalist theories assuming

autonomy- or efficiency-maximizing behavior by governments (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006: 1151-5). The empowerment of an IPI is bound to reduce the autonomy or power of governments; complicate or slow down decision-making; and contribute little to or even undermine the credibility of international commitments. To solve this puzzle, three main alternative hypotheses have been put forward. The ‘policy-seeking hypothesis’ assumes that governments are willing to cede power to IPIs to further their favourite policy outcomes (Bräuninger et al. 2001); the ‘legitimacy-seeking hypothesis’ stipulates that governments empower IPIs to safeguard the legitimacy of international organizations (Rittberger 2005; Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006); and the ‘inter-institutional bargaining hypothesis’ (Farrell and Héritier 2003, 2007) points out how IPIs can use limited powers to extract concessions from governments in organizational negotiation and decision-making processes.

A systematic mapping of the design of IPIs and its development is a necessary first step for the study of parliamentarization beyond the EU. In recent years, there have been several data collection projects seeking to capture the variety of institutional designs and developments in international organizations (e.g. Haftel 2007, 2012, 2013; Powers and Goertz 2011; Hooghe and Marks 2013; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2013). These data sets, however, do not include IPIs or do so in only rudimentary ways. On the other hand, the literature on IPIs (see next section) suffers from inconsistent concepts and measurements, insufficient historical depth for studying the development of IPIs, and underdeveloped links to the literature on the institutional design of international organizations. We therefore seek to build a dataset of IPIs that captures the relevant design features and activity profiles of IPIs, can be linked to the datasets on international organizations, and permits us to analyse the evolution of IPIs.

In this paper, we present our conceptualization of IPIs and first descriptive results for illustrative purposes. Work on this dataset has only started in late 2013 and coding is still ongoing. The following section presents a review of the literature on IPIs up to date. Next, definitional and conceptual discussions follow. The last section discusses issues of operationalization and introduces some descriptive results.

### **The state of the literature on international parliamentary institutions**

Research on International parliamentary institutions started about twenty years ago with the commissioning of reports for the Inter-parliamentary Union (Klebes 1990; Polish Senate 2006<sup>1</sup>), and has picked up speed in the last decade, with the emergence of the first series of empirical studies (Cutler 2001; 2006; 2013; Sabic 2008; Navarro 2010; Kissling 2014; Lenz 2013a; Cofelice 2013; Costa and Dri 2013; Lucci 2013; De Puig 2004; 2008; Rüländ and Bechle 2014). The origin of these studies is often found in the field of comparative regionalization, where questions about the parallel strengthening of regional integration have pioneered the comparisons between the EP and other institutions. Some of the authors that have turned their attention into IPIs come from this area (Dri 2010; 2013; Draper 2012; Malamud and Sousa 2007) and have used its background to compare parliamentarization across regions, specially between Europe and South-America (Grabendorff 1992; Dri 2010) but also in other regions such as East-Asia (Rüländ & Bechle 2014). Nevertheless, the literature is only beginning to produce explanatory theories, well-defined concepts and systematic empirical evidence.

---

<sup>1</sup> Referring to the report by the Secretary General of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe John Priestman on relations between national parliaments and international parliamentary assemblies of 1980.

Only a few recent studies propose explanations of the emergence and development of IPIs. Lenz (2013a) uses world polity theory and the ideas of the normative power of Europe developed by Manners (2002; 2006) as a theoretical start point for his explanation (see also Lenz 2013b). He argues that liberal explanations of parliamentarization are unrealistic because they assume that pooling sovereignty creates a demand for political representation at the international level, which is then supplied by organizations of regional integration. Given the existence of IPIs in autocratic contexts and the lack of evidence confirming that such a democratic demand exists, Lenz argues that norm entrepreneurs like the EU are able to influence the system of norms which constitute the world polity to the extent that a demand for parliamentarization is created. In a similar light Navarro (2010) tries to establish the first steps of a general theory of regional parliamentarization gaining insights on the internal and external factors contributing to the creation of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). Among those, the normative standard of the EP is a relevant one, inserted in a liberal set of assumptions (emphasising the influence of beliefs of decision-making elites).

The supply of this parliamentarization demand will depend on the nature of IOs. Hooghe and Marks<sup>2</sup> argue that the design of IOs (including whether they develop IPIs) depends on whether they are functionally specific or general-purpose organisations. They show that IPIs are far more frequent in general-purpose organisations. Lenz (2013a) comes to the conclusion that it is not sufficient that an International Organization (IO) is general-purpose for it being likely to generate an IPI; it also has to be society-oriented, which he defines as organizations which have an open-ended purpose and that 'ultimately aspire to transform societies' (Lenz 2013a: 13).

We suspect that another reason for the relative scarcity of theoretical work on IPIs lies in the fact that we have very little reliable information about the nature, competences and evolution of IPIs. The current literature contains typologies and definitions that aim to classify IPIs into different groups. In general, typologies tend to capture a gradient of authority or formalization, establishing various steps between loose and informal grouping of national parliamentarians and full-fledged autonomous international organizations with legal personality.

Klebes (1990) classifies the powers of IPIs from the point of view of their "management of their internal affairs", being of course an indicator of autonomy vis-à-vis their hosting IO. He considers as well the national political representativeness of the delegates it seats. The resulting typology divides IPIs between assemblies, where members are directly elected, integrated assemblies which are an "integral part of international governmental or supranational organizations" and associations, which are assemblies of indirectly elected members. Cutler (2001) distinguishes four types: (1) Congresses: meetings of parliamentarians without a permanent secretariat; (2) Assemblies: meetings of parliamentarians on a regular basis even if they have no formal institutionalization; (3) Parliaments: with the capacity of approving recommendations; and (4) Legislatures: with full-fledged legislative capacity.

Kissling's (2014) joins in with her own typology, which is also ordered on the degree of institutionalization. Her least institutionalized category is (1) Inter-parliamentary government run / inspired NGOs (GRINGOs). These are virtually non-formalized networks, thus the next category represents a leap in institutionalization. (2) International or regional parliamentary organizations are created by national legislative powers and delegates are national parliamentarians. (3) International

---

<sup>2</sup> Citation not available

or regional parliamentary specialized agencies are similar in their level of institutionalization to the last type, but these function ‘within an international or regional governmental system’ (Kissling 2014:26). Lastly, (4) Parliamentary organs of international or regional organizations are IPIs subordinated to a superior international system. Finally, Cofelice combines the work of Cutler (2006) and Kissling (2014) and distinguishes between Transnational Networks of Parliamentarians for the various un-formalized groups of parliamentarians, and IPIs for all remaining bodies. What remains unclear, however, is to what extent these typologies help us either to explain or to map the development of IPIs in a systematic way. We are also uncertain as to whether these typologies actually fit the real world of IPIs. Indeed, whether and what kind of typologies make sense is a question that will have to be answered on the basis of systematic empirical data.

The literature contains a number of historical accounts of one or a few IPIs, and selected efforts to collect in depth information on the development of particular IPIs (e.g. Kraft-Kasack 2008; Puig 2004, 2008; Paren and Stacey 2001; Dri 2009). The most important study in this group is Kissling (2014; for a similar contribution see Marschall 2005; see also the other contributions in Levi et al. 2014) who provide an overview of the year of foundation, membership, and related international organisations of a wide range of IPIs. Kissling also draws attention to several questions about IPIs: What is their relationship to international organisations? What oversight and decision powers and other sources of authority do they have? How are they organised internally? How are their members selected? Our data collection speaks to all of these questions.

Hooghe and Marks<sup>3</sup> collect data on the authority of 72 international organisations. Amongst other things, they examine whether IOs delegate agenda-setting or decision-making authority to organised non-state bodies (secretariats, consultative bodies, assemblies, executives or judicial bodies). They focus on the following areas: membership accession, suspension or expulsion, policy making, drafting the budget, budgetary non-compliance, and constitutional reform. Hooghe and Marks’ data can be used to identify whether IOs delegated to ‘parliaments, understood as consultative or legislative bodies composed primarily of elected politicians’ in any of these areas. Our data collection encompasses the IPIs of all international organisations in Hooghe and Marks’ list (26 IPIs). We also take inspiration from the aforementioned areas of authority. We add information on what it means to “grant authority” to an IPI, and on the institutionalisation of IPIs. Furthermore, considering Kissling’s (2014) insights, we do not pre-suppose that an IPI has to be linked to an international organisation.

Finally, most studies of IPIs raise the question as to whether they affect policy or the legitimacy of international organisations. Even though one might find selected positive responses, it is largely uncontroversial that ‘many existing regional “parliaments” or “assemblies” are quite ineffective — the kind of entities that spread skepticism about international law or institutions of any kind’ (Slaughter 2004:106<sup>4</sup>). Yet, as the example of the EP makes clear, it is not the case that IPIs are necessarily ineffective. The problem rather seems to lie in the executive dominance of international organisations that goes together with weak IPI competences, resources and institutionalisation. Even though we will not be able to study whether IPIs are ultimately more or less effective depending on their characteristics, our data collection includes information not only on competences but, to the extent possible, also on the resources and institutionalisation of IPIs.

---

<sup>3</sup> Citation not available

<sup>4</sup> Also in Cofelice (2013:6)

## **Definition of international parliamentary institutions**

We define an IPI as an institution that (1) transcends national borders, (2) has a collegial organization, (3) and at least some directly or indirectly elected members. This definition builds on existing *organisational* understandings of national parliaments and, thus, secures consistency in the meaning of “parliament” as we move from the national to the international domain. At the same time, the definition rejects both *functional* definitions of parliament and excessive organisational demands that are inappropriate for the unconsolidated nature of IPIs. Finally, the definition demarcates IPIs from other international institutions such as secretariats and intergovernmental bodies and, thus, tells us what is distinctive about IPIs in the international realm.

In the literature on national parliaments, we find reputational, functional and organisational definitions. For instance, Fish and Kroenig’s (2009: 14) “parliamentary power index” works with a reputational definition (see also Przeworski et al. 2000; Beck et al. 2001):

The identity of the “national legislature” is generally unproblematic ... Each country included in this study has a body that is universally recognized as the national legislature, although several countries, most notably the monarchies of the Persian Gulf region, have advisory councils that serve the monarch rather than legislatures in the traditional sense.

We cannot use a reputational definition because there is no universal agreement on the identity of an IPI, as the diversity of typologies in the current literature make clear (see above).

*Functional* approaches define parliaments on the basis of their contribution to two normative ambitions of democratic constitutions: namely to limit executive-dominance of the state, and to represent society in the exercise of state authority. Inspired by the first ambition, scholars define the parliament as the institution with legislative authority (hence “legislature”). According to Norton (1999: xi; see also Norton 1990: 1; Kreppel 2011: 122): ‘Legislatures have one core defining function: that of giving assent to measures that, by virtue of that assent, are to be binding on society.’ Inspired by the second ambition, scholars argue that ‘legislatures join society to the legal structure of authority in the state. Legislatures are representative bodies: they reflect the sentiments and opinions of the citizens’ (Olson 1994: 1).

Functional definitions have three shortcomings. First, they are not discriminatory: nationally and internationally, actors other than parliaments also legislate and/or represent. Second, they are not exhaustive: nationally and internationally, we may think of institutions as parliaments, even if defective, despite the fact that they lack legislative authority and do not ‘join society to the legal structure of authority in the state’ (Olson 1994). Third, for our purpose in particular, it is problematic that functional definitions take for granted characteristics in the area of legislative authority that we want to study. Sabic (2008) runs into this problem when discussing what IPIs are by what ‘they do’. Overall, it appears that functional definitions tell us more about what normative theorists want parliaments to achieve than about what parliaments really are.

*Organisational* definitions maintain that parliaments are designed according to principles that are qualitatively different from the principles that guide the design of other political entities. Organisational definitions are not as prominent in the literature as functional definitions but nonetheless more suitable for our purpose. They build on Weber’s (in Held 2006) view that parliamentary organisation reflects a ‘political logic’ that is different from the hierarchical and bureaucratic characteristics of executives. Not only does the acquisition of institutional membership

in parliaments require election rather than selection or appointment, the relationship among members is also particular. As Strøm (1998: 23) highlights:

Fundamentally, legislatures are *collegial*, rather than hierarchical, organisations. They are unlike bureaucracies or military services in which some individuals have the authority to give commands to others.

We follow the organisational line of thinking, first, because it does not impose excessive demands regarding the legislative authority and representative quality of IPIs. Nevertheless, we also acknowledge that the unconsolidated nature of IPIs requires us to loosen the demands of our organisational definition: We do not expect that all IPI members are necessarily elected, nor do they have to be elected to their institution directly. A second benefit of the organisational definition is that it demarcates IPIs from other institutions in the international realm. Their collegial nature sets IPIs apart from international bureaucracies that, as national bureaucracies, are hierarchies. The electoral link distinguishes IPIs and their members from intergovernmental bodies that typically dominate international organisations.

### **Conceptualisation of international parliamentary institutions**

As figure 1 illustrates, the nature of IPIs varies along three dimensions: constitutional status, institutional authority and institutionalization. First, as Kissling's (2014) overview indicates, IPIs are not necessarily embedded in international organisations. They may lack organisational links entirely or focus on the work of a particular organisation while not being recognised. Some IPIs, such as the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly or the NATO Parliamentary Assembly are recognised by but not formally a part of an international organisation.

Second, we study the institutional authority of IPIs. We are interested in the extent to which IPIs obtain competences in areas in which also national parliaments have historically struggled (and, in many countries, continue to struggle) for authority (Congleton 2011): legislation and decision-making, oversight, the budget, executive appointment, and constitutional questions over the membership and basic rules of an international organisation. While these dimensions are in line with the concerns of the existing literature (see above), we note that institutional authority is not only about authority over actors and issues, but also about freedom from interference. Particularly in international organisations, in which the norm is executive dominance of all areas of the organisation's politics, the ability of an IPI to set its own priorities, the frequency of its meetings and the organisation of its proceedings become important sources of autonomy. It is worth noting that there may be trade-offs related to an IPI's constitutional status and institutional authority: Formal status in an IO is necessary for obtaining institutional competences, yet it may reduce autonomy.

Third, we are interested in the institutionalisation of IPIs, which provides clues about the way a parliament operates, including the question about whether it operates effectively (cf. Polsby 1968). We examine the capacity of parliament to act on the basis of its membership, an internal system of functional committee differentiation, a strong budget and regular sessions. We also examine the nature of parliamentary factions. In the international realm, the main question here is whether parliaments produce alliances that deviate from nationality. Such alliances might be, for instance, ideological, regional or ethnic. Finally, beyond the requirement that an IPI must have at least some directly or indirectly elected members, we leave the nature of the electoral connection open for

empirical investigation. In the case of IPIs, one major question, as in national parliaments, is whether all members are elected. The other major question is where IPIs stand on a continuum from nationally-segmented to system-wide elections – a continuum on which parliaments move through the synchronisation of electoral cycles, common electoral rules, cross-border electoral practices such as common lists, and direct elections.

### **Operationalization & and empirical illustrations**

Tracking the definitional boundaries outlined above, we work with a population of 60 IPIs (see Annex 1). Other studies have come up with more or less restrictive lists depending on their definitions. The most widely publicised list was elaborated by Kissling (2014) and incorporates over 110 entries, although as mentioned above, many of those are loose networks of parliamentarians. On the other side of the spectrum, Cutler (2001) or Cofelice (2013) work with populations of less than 30.

Figure 2 shows the current regional clustering and the emergence of our population of IPIs. The geographical distribution of IPIs exhibit two characteristics that should come as no surprise. First, most institutions have a regionally limited configuration. Only 9 of them have member states located in more than one region. These IPIs are organized around colonial or linguistic ties, like the Francophone Parliamentary Assembly, or associated to IOs with a trans-regional reach, such as NATO Parliamentary Assembly. All other institutions cluster around a single zone. Second, out of the geographically concentrated IPIs, Europe is the region with a higher number of them. Although the superior integration of Europe vis-à-vis other areas is commonplace, the graph also shows that the Americas and Africa have also developed a considerable number of regional IPIs.

The speed at which these institutions have been created since 1945 has grown exponentially. Before WWII there was only one body within our definition, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (created in 1889). At the end of the 60's there were already 9, and the growth took off from there especially since 1990. Developments in Latin America and Africa during that time are the greatest contributors to this trend. The newest IPI in our list is the Parliament of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) which was created in 2010; it remains to be seen whether the upward tendency is sustainable in the future.

We have so far collected information for over 50 variables of 8 IPIs since their creation ( $n=244$ ). This is a limited sample but it provides us with useful pictures that are likely to point out trends that we will encounter further into the coding process. Hence at this stage, any findings are provisional. In order to measure each of the dimensions outlined above, we have selected indicators capturing aspects we judge to be revealing of each of the concepts. For instance, the capacity of an IPI is disaggregated through four indicators: its number of members, number of committees, weeks in session and annual budget. All these indicators capture particular aspects of capacity, and in common allow us to draw conclusions about the dimension as a whole. In this paper, however, we only present disaggregated data because testing different data aggregation strategies makes sense only once our data collection has progressed further.

The first dimension, constitutional status, is operationalized as acts of formal recognition between the IPIs and IOs. As described above, a parliamentary institution may be disconnected from an IO on the one side of the scale, or be part of its decision-making bodies on the other. An act of formal recognition is defined as a rule generated by the IPI or the IO in which their relationship is stated.

These acts are normally foundational documents or other basic legal instruments. Out of our population, at least 26 IPIs are integral part of a larger organization, while 15 or more are associated with one. A clear example of a stand-alone IPI is the Inter-Parliamentary Union, while the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is a prototypical case of an IPI within an IO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is only committed to the organization but not part of its structure.

The second dimension, institutional autonomy, is more complex and hence measured through a total of 10 indicators grouped into 'competences' or 'autonomy' (see figure 1). The first group is meant to set values to the degree of manoeuvre IPIs have to affect the functioning or structure of their organization. Our operational questions ask for whether it can approve treaty changes, accept new members, appoint personnel or issue legal acts. For this last case, we use an ordinal scale with four values, where 0 means the IPI has no right to do so and 4 that it holds veto rights over the approval of legal acts. Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of this variable. Although it marks an upward trend, the abrupt changes indicate that variation is not found so much in changes within IPIs, but rather in the emergence of new institutions that incorporate higher values from their conception. This is a characteristic repeated for most variables of institutional authority. The second group of indicators addresses the autonomy of the IPIs. Primary and secondary data is screened in search of evidence about the freedom IPIs have to consider any issue, control the frequency of their meetings or approve and amend their rules of procedure.

The third dimension, institutionalization, holds the largest collection of indicators. Given the magnitude of the concept, it is operationalized through an array of indicators that include important elements of political capacity, such as number of committees, and descriptors of their structure such as the share of directly elected members. Figures 4 and 5 visualize two of the most noticeable aspects of institutionalization, annual budget and number of members. For these variables there is clear growth, although it is difficult that the steady increase in number of member is shared by a lot of non-European IPIs, the sample seems to indicate that more countries join than leave IPIs through time. The growth in real-terms budget of most IPIs signals that they strive for further institutionalization. We note, though, that we also collect data on the budget of IOs to test whether IPI budgets grow only in absolute numbers or also in comparison to the IOs they belong to.

There are less graphic variables which are equally important to capture the level of institutionalization. Two of them look at the fractional division of IPIs: the number of fractions in which IPIs are divided (the political groups in the EP, to mention a clear example) and the logic of this division. IPIs in which parliamentarians do not sit along national lines prove to have a substantially different level of institutionalization than those in which they do. Our sample shows that although the firsts are likely to be a minority, the EP is not the only instance of non-national fractionalization. Lastly, we make use of a series of indicators that reveal aspects about the composition of IPIs. The most relevant are related to the width of the elections, and whether they are synchronous or organized with common rules. Evidence for all these is researched within the corpus of rules and production of IPIs. These aspects are only achieved in IPIs with the greatest levels of institutionalization, namely the EP and to a certain extent the parliaments of the Andean (Parlandino) and South American (Parlasur) integration organizations. Both IPIs were originally composed of exclusively indirectly elected members but shifted to direct elections in 1996 and 2010 respectively.

## **Conclusion**

In this paper we have tried to set the foundations for a sounder study of parliamentary institutions beyond the state. Our main contribution arises from joining the recent efforts of theorization with an empirical perspective. We collect a time series cross sectional database of 60 IPIs, which we expect will enable us to (1) overcome the problems of definition and categorization which the incipient research has shown, (2) measure what we consider to be the three main dimensions along which IPIs vary in nature: constitutional status, institutional authority and institutionalization, and (3) produce and test explanations of the development of IPIs in a systematic way. Our first exploratory results suggest that newer IPIs emerge with higher values in in their indicators of institutional authority, while change within IPIs is infrequent. This trend contrasts with their levels of constitutional status or institutionalization, where there is greater internal change but no clear association between these variables and age of the institution.

## Figures

Figure 1. Conceptualisation of international parliamentary institutions




Figure 2. Number of IPIs by region and total growth




Figure 3. Average of decision-making values




Figure 4. Evolution of IPI's budget in millions of 2010 USD





Figure 5. Number of member states of each IPI



## References

- Archibugi, D, & Held, D .2011. Cosmopolitan democracy: Paths and agents. ISA Annual Convention.
- Auel, Katrin, and Tapio Raunio, eds. 2014. Connecting with the Electorate? Parliamentary Communication in EU Affairs. *Journal of Legislative Studies* 20:1.
- Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions." *World Bank Economic Review* 15 (1):165-76.
- Böhmelt, Tobias, Vally Koubi, and Thomas Bernauer. 2013. "Civil society participation in global governance: Insights from climate politics." *European Journal of Political Research*.
- Bräuninger, Thomas, Tanja Cornelius, Thomas König, and Thomas Schuster. 2001. "The Dynamics of European Integration: a Constitutional Analysis of the Amsterdam Treaty." In *The Rules of Integration*, ed. G. Schneider and M. Aspinwall. Manchester: Manchester University Press,46-68.
- Cofelice, A. 2013. International parliamentary institutions: some preliminary findings and setting a research agenda. UNU-CRIS Working Papers, Retrieved from <http://eugrasp.eu/fileadmin/workingpapers/W-2012-3.pdf>
- Congleton, Roger D. 2011. *Perfecting Parliament*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Costa, O., Dri, C., & Stavridis, S. (2013). *Parliamentary dimensions of regionalization and globalization the role of inter-parliamentary institutions*. Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved from <http://us.macmillan.com/parliamentarydimensionsofregionalizationandglobalization/OliverCosta>
- Cutler, Robert M. 2001. *The Emergence of International Parliamentary Institutions: New Networks of Influence in World Society*. pp. 201–229 in *Who Is Afraid of the State? Canada in a World of Multiple Centres of Power*, ed. Gordon S. Smith and Daniel Wolfish. University of Toronto Press.
- . 2006. The Paradox of Intentional Emergent Coherence: Organization and Decision in a Complex World *Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 9-27.. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645302>
- . 2013. International Parliamentary Institutions as Organizations. *Journal of International Organizations Studies* 4: 104-126.
- De Puig, Lluís Maria. 2004. "International parliamentarism: An introduction to its history." *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 24 (1):13-62.
- . 2008. *International parliaments*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- Draper, Peter (2012). *Breaking Free from Europe: Why Africa Needs Another Model of Regional Integration*. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 47(1): 67-82.
- Dri, Clarissa 2009. At what point does a legislature become institutionalized? the mercosur parliament's path. *Brazilian political science review*. (Online), 4.
- 2010. Limits of the Institutional Mimesis of the European Union: The Case of the Mercosur Parliament. *Latin American Policy* 1(1): 52-74.
- Farrell, Henry, and Adrienne Héritier. 2003. "Formal and Informal Institutions Under Codecision: Continuous Constitution-Building in Europe." *Governance* 16:577-600.
- . 2007. "Codecision and institutional change." *West European Politics* 30 (2):285-300.

- Fish, M. Steven, and Matthew Kroenig. 2009. *The Handbook of National Legislatures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Grabendorff, Wolf. 1992. *The European Parliament and the Central American Parliament: The Parliamentary Dimension of Relations between Central America and the European Community. The Reconstruction of Central America: The Role of the European Community*. Joaquín Roy, Ed. Miami, North-South Center, University of Miami: 95-105.
- Haftel, Yoram Z. 2013. "Commerce and institutions: Trade, scope, and the design of regional economic organizations." *The Review of International Organizations* 8 (3):389-414.
- Haftel, Yoram Z. 2007. "Designing for Peace: Regional Integration Arrangements, Institutional Variation, and Militarized Interstate Disputes." *International Organization* 61 (01):217-37.
- . 2012. *Regional Economic Institutions and Conflict Mitigation: Design, Implementation, and the Promise of Peace*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Held, David. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Held, David. 2006. *Models of Democracy*. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hix, Simon, Abdul G. Noury, and Gérard Roland. 2007. *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2013. "The Authority of International Organizations." University of Amsterdam / University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Keohane, Robert O. 2006. "Accountability in World Politics." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 29 (2):75-87.
- , Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik. 2009. "Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism." *International Organization* 63 (01):1-31.
- Kissling, Claudia. 2014. "The legal and political status of international parliamentary institutions." In *The Democratization of International Institutions*, ed. G. Finizio, L. Levi and N. Vallinoto. Abingdon / New York: Routledge, 25-53.
- Klebes, Heinrich. 1990. "The Development of International Parliamentary Institutions", in: *Constitutional and Parliamentary Information*, Vol. 1, No. 159
- Kreppel, Amie. 2011. "Legislatures." In *Comparative Politics*, ed. D. Caramani. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 121-40.
- Lenz, T. 2013a. *International sources of institutional change: Parliamentarization in regional economic organizations*. Unpublished draft
- Lenz, T. 2013b. *Eu normative power and regionalism: Ideational diffusion and its limits*. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48(2), 211-228. doi: 10.1177/0010836713485539
- Levi, Lucio, Giovanni Finizio, and Nicola Vallinoto, eds. 2014. *The Democratization of International Institutions. First International Democracy Report*. Abingdon / New York: Routledge.
- Lucci, Juan José. 2013. *MERCOSUR Parliament: Institutional weakness and political stalemate. Analysis six years after its formation*. *Journal of Arts and Humanities*. Vol 2, No 3.

- Malkamud, A., & de Sousa, L. 2007. Regional parliaments in europe and latin america: Between empowerment and irrelevance In A. Ribeiro Hoffmann & A. van der Vleuten (Eds.), , Closing or Widening the Gap? Legitimacy and Democracy in Regional International Organizations Retrieved from [http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Researchers/malamud/Chapter 5 - Supranational parliaments \(Malamud & De Sousa\).pdf](http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Researchers/malamud/Chapter 5 - Supranational parliaments (Malamud & De Sousa).pdf)
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Jon C. W. Pevehouse. 2013. "The Expansion of Preferential Trading Arrangements." *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (3):592-604.
- Marschall, Stefan. 2005. *Transnationale Repräsentation in Parlamentarischen Versammlungen*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Martin, Lisa L. 2000. *Democratic Commitments*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Navarro, Julien. 2010. The Creation and Transformation of Regional Parliamentary Assemblies: Lessons from the Pan-African Parliament. *Journal of Legislative Studies* 01/2010.
- Norton, Philip,ed. 1990. *Legislatures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Norton, Philip. 1999. "General Introduction." In *Parliaments and Pressure Groups in Western Europe*, ed. P. Norton. London: Frank Cass,xi-xiii.
- Olson, David M. 1994. *Legislative Institutions: A Comparative View*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." *The American Political Science Review* 62 (1):144-68.
- Powers, Kathy, and Garry Goertz. 2011. "The economic-institutional construction of regions: conceptualisation and operationalisation." *Review of International Studies* 37 (05):2387-415.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, and José Antonio Cheibub. 2000. *Democracy and Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rittberger, Berthold, and Frank Schimmelfennig. 2006. "Explaining the constitutionalization of the European Union." *Journal of European Public Policy* 13 (8):1148 - 67.
- Rittberger, Berthold. 2005. *Building Europe's Parliament: Democratic Representation Beyond the Nation State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rüland, Jürgen and Karsten Bechle 2014. Defending State-Centric Regionalism through Mimicry and Localization: Regional Parliamentary Bodies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Mercosur. *Journal of International Relations and Development*. 17, 61–88.
- Rüland, Jürgen and Karsten Bechle 2014. Defending State-Centric Regionalism through Mimicry and Localization: Regional Parliamentary Bodies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Mercosur. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 17, 61–88
- Sabic, zlatko. 2008.. *Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions*. *Parliamentary Affairs* 61(2): 255-271.
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2004. *A New World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Strøm, Kaare. 1998. "Parliamentary committees in European democracies." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 4 (1):21-59.
- Winzen, Thomas. 2012. "National parliamentary control of European Union affairs: a cross-national and longitudinal comparison." *West European Politics* 35 (3):657-72.

-----, 2013. "European integration and national parliamentary oversight institutions." *European Union Politics* 14 (2):297-323.

Zürn, Michael. 2000. "Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other International Institutions." *European Journal of International Relations* 6 (2):183-221.

## **Annex 1. List of International Parliamentary Institutions**

<b>International Parliamentary Institutions</b>	<b>Acronym</b>
ACP Consultative Assembly	
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly	JPA
African Parliamentary Union	APU
Amazonian Parliament	
Andean Parliament	Parlandino
Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union	AIPU
Arab Transitional Parliament	ATP
ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly	AIPA
Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development	AFPPD
Asian Parliamentary Assembly	APA
Asian-Pacific Parliamentarians' Union	
Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians	ACCP
Association of Pacific Island Legislatures	APIL
Association of Senates, Shoorā and Equivalent Councils in Africa and the Arab World	ASSECAA
Baltic Assembly	BA
Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference	BSPC
Benelux Consultative Interparliamentary Council	Benelux
CEMAC Community Parliament	CEMAC
Central American Parliament	Parlacen
Cetinje (formerly Balkans) Parliamentary Forum	Cetinje
Committee of Members of Parliament of the EFTA Countries	EFTA
Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union	COSAC
Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region	CPAR
Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb Union	
East African Legislative Assembly of the East African Community	EALA
EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee	EEAJPC
Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly	EuroLat
Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly	EMPA
European Parliament	EP
Forum of Asia Pacific Parliamentarians for Education	FASPPED
Forum of Portuguese Speaking Parliaments	FPLP
Forum of the Presidents of the Legislative Powers of Central America	FOPREL
Francophone Parliamentary Assembly	APF
GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) Parliamentary Assembly	GUAM
IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union	IPU-IGAD
Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States	IPA CIS

Interparliamentary Assembly of the Eurasian Economic Community	IPA Eur-AsEC
Interparliamentary Committee on the Dutch Language Union	NTU
Inter-Parliamentary Union	IPU
Latin American Parliament	Parlatino
MERCOSUR Parliament	Parlasur
NATO Parliamentary Assembly	NATO
Nordic Council	NC
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly	OSCE PA
Pan-African Parliament	PAP
Parliament of the Economic Community of West African States (Community Parliament)	Community Parliament
Parliamentary Assembly of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries	PA CPLP
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe	PACE
Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean	PAM
Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation	PABSEC
Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty	PA OCTS
Parliamentary Assembly of the Russia- Belarus Union State	
Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas	COPA
Parliamentary Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe	SEE
Parliamentary dimension of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative	AII
Parliamentary Dimension of the Central European Initiative	CEI
Parliamentary Union of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference Member States	PUIC
SADC Parliamentary Forum	SADC
South Caucasus Parliamentary Initiative	SCPI
UEMOA Interparliamentary Committee	UEMOA

## Annex 2. Dimensions, attributes and indicators of IPIs

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
	<b><u>Constitutional status</u></b>
	<b>IO Affiliation</b>
<u>IO affiliation</u>	Does the assembly have an affiliation to an international organisation
<u>IO affiliation2</u>	If 1, 2 or 3 to which one?
	<b><u>Institutional Authority</u></b>
	<b>Competences</b>
<u>Constitution 1: Agenda-setting</u>	Does the assembly have the right to place proposals for changes to the organisation's treaties on the

	agenda of the DMB?
<u>Constitution 2:</u> <u>Decision-making</u>	Does the assembly have power over changes to the organisation's treaties?
<u>Constitution 3:</u> <u>Membership</u>	Does the assembly have power over the accession of new member states to the organisation?
<u>Decision-making</u>	Equivalent to legislative competences, but might not only cover legislation in IOs
<u>Institutional agenda-setting</u>	Another element of legislative competences. Most assemblies can propose something but the right to place an issue on the agenda of other institutions is different in that this issue cannot be ignored. Agenda-setting rights mean that other institutions cannot withhold legislative proposals.
<u>Oversight</u>	Oversight refers to the rights of a parliament to examine, or possibly sanction the actions of other actors.
<u>Budget 1:</u> <u>Changes to budget sources</u>	Budgetary rights are among the oldest ones parliaments have had. They give considerable power as they matter for almost all policy areas and activities of the organisation.
<u>Budget 2: Changes to distribution</u>	
<u>Budget 3: Restricted domains</u>	Are parliamentary rights restricted regarding some sections of the budget?
<u>Appointment 1:</u> <u>Head of the bureaucracy</u>	Does the parliament participate in the appointment of the leader of the organisation's bureaucracy (often called the secretary-general but could also be "President" as in the EU, "Director-General" etc.)
<u>Appointment 2:</u> <u>Head of the DMB</u>	
<u>Appointment 3:</u> <u>Positions above identical?</u>	
<u>Appointment 4:</u> <u>Impeachment head of bureaucracy</u>	Does the assembly have the right to impeach the head of bureaucracy?
<u>Appointment 5:</u> <u>Impeachment Head of DMB</u>	
<b>Institutional Autonomy</b>	
<u>Negative agenda-control</u>	Outside actors cannot force consideration of an issue

<u>Positive agenda-control</u>	Assembly is free to consider all matters it wants
<u>Meeting control</u>	Assembly controls the frequency of its meetings
<u>Organisation control</u>	Assembly controls its internal organisation. This means that there are no fixed rules on the parliament's internal rules, structures and procedures that the assembly cannot change unilaterally – and no actors that can make such rules, except by rewriting the organisations treaties.
<b><u>Institutionalisation</u></b>	
<b>Capacity</b>	
<u>Total n of members (countries)</u>	
<u>Total n of members (seats)</u>	
<u>Total n of committees</u>	Not counting temporary committees
<u>Committee coverage 1</u>	Does the functional scope of the committee system match the functional scope of the organisation? Committees-department congruence is important for the capacity of an assembly to participate in the policy-process
<u>Committee coverage 2</u>	Are the treaty-based restrictions regarding the functional scope of the committee system (Implies 0 in "Organisation control" above)
<u>Committee coverage 3</u>	Identification of "clear gaps" in the functional scope of the committee system
<u>Budget unadjusted</u>	Total budget of the assembly, unadjusted for year, currency or purchasing power
<u>Budget unadjusted2</u>	Total budget of the International Organization, unadjusted for year, currency or purchasing power
<u>Budget currency</u>	Currency of the unadjusted budget
<u>Budget currency2</u>	Currency of the unadjusted budget
<u>Sessions</u>	Time the assembly is in meetings per year in weeks
<u>Sessions</u>	Time the assembly is in session per year in weeks
<b>Factions</b>	
<u>N of factions</u>	Number of institutionalised factions. "Institutionalised": stable existence over a sustained period of time. Signs of institutionalisation: consensual recognition in secondary literature, organisational resources and structures, formal recognition in assembly rules, identification in assembly documents / website).

	Focus on the most encompassing factions, sub-divisions within factions not counted (e.g. EPP rather than German conservatives in the EP).
<u>Faction logic 1</u>	Are there any formal rules regulating factions, or is it based on informal arrangements?
<u>Faction logic 2</u>	What is the logic behind factional differentiation?
<u>Faction logic 3</u>	If the logic “other” applies, state which logic.
<b>Composition</b>	
<u>Elections</u>	Among the members that are directly/indirectly elected, by what means is the majority elected?
<u>Aspiration elections</u>	Do the organisation or assembly rules explicitly state the goal of direct/indirect elections of <i>all members</i> .
<u>Share of indirectly elected members</u>	Share of indirectly elected members <i>of all assembly members</i> .
<u>Share of directly elected members</u>	<i>Of all assembly members</i> .
<u>Share of non-elected members</u>	<i>Of all assembly members</i> .
<u>Synchronous elections</u>	Regarding directly/indirectly elected members, do the assembly or organisation rules state that elections be held at the same time?
<u>Common election rules</u>	Do the assembly or organisation rules define common rules for the election of those members that are directly/indirectly elected?
<u>Segmentation 1</u>	Regarding directly/indirectly elected members, in what kind of sub-units are elections segmented, if any? We considered a sub-unit any entity other than the whole organisation’s territory that obtains a pre-defined number of seats regardless of the electoral outcome. When sub-units are nested (e.g. provinces within countries), we consider only the highest sub-unit.
<u>Segmentation 2</u>	If “other” applies above, state here.
<u>Cross-national elections</u>	Do electoral rules mention electoral practices that transcend national borders such as multi-national lists or multi-national districts?
<u>Seat distribution</u>	In what way are seats distributed over sub-units? “Degressive proportionality” over-represents small sub-units and under-represents large sub-units.