CYPRUS AND THE UNITED NATIONS:
AN APPRECIATION OF PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY

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1965 was one of the worst years for the United Nations. Its prestige was low; its critics were vocal. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, few world leaders were ready to say that the organization was useless or even in real danger of dissolution. President Johnson's appointment of Mr. Justice Goldberg as UN ambassador— and Mr. Goldberg's acceptance of the position—were among many indications of agreement that the United Nations has something more than ceremonial significance. Of course, the mere continuing existence of any international organization, even the most rudimentary and technically oriented kind, may do good and is unlikely to do harm. The more optimistic will see a developing world community, and, if such a thing is emerging, the United Nations surely has some share in the process. This paper would like to suggest that, apart from any hopes for the future, the United Nations performs a unique and important function for the world to today. Such a tough-minded national leader as Lyndon Johnson, concerned before all else with national self-interest, has indicated his awareness that the organization has a real contribution to make for his nation.

There is a term for this particular and characteristic activity of the United Nations: "parliamentary diplomacy," a term coined by Dean Rusk.[1] The activity is a new one, for the limited membership and prestige of the League made ineffective the sort of process we are concerned with here. International technical or functional agencies are older than the United Nations, and so are most forms of mediation and peace-keeping. Parliamentary diplomacy, as we know it, means the new process which involves nations with widely differing goals in activity formally organized as a continuing system of regulated debate. The United Nations provides the only forum in which admittedly hostile nations repeatedly meet in debate over the widest imaginable range of topics. This debate is ostensibly meant to produce statements of joint intent in a form that is appropriate for a public vote. In the General Assembly the resulting resolution is only a recommendation, and in many cases the debate will not produce even a substantive resolution.[2] The substance or the implementation of United Nations resolutions is of less importance because the function of the resolutions is to focus discussions and statements, as central organizers of a

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[1]Dean Rusk, "Parliamentary Diplomacy—Debate *vs.* Negotiation," *World Affairs Interpreter,* 26 (1955), 121–38. Some writers attribute the term to Philip Jessup (for instance, H. G. Nicholas, *The United Nations as a Political Institution* (Oxford, 1963), 123) but Dr. Jessup himself credits Mr. Rusk in "Parliamentary Diplomacy," *Receuil des Cours,* Hague Academy of International Law, 89 (1956), 185.

[2]Sydney D. Bailey notes that a substantial number of items of business of the General Assembly fail to produce resolutions, and that many resolutions themselves are "formal or procedural," lacking in substantive content. He suggests that in many cases it might be preferable not to vote on a resolution. *The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice* (New York, 1960), 157–8.

CHYPRE ET LES NATIONS UNIES : UNE APPRECIATION DE LA DIPLOMATIE PARLEMENTAIRE

Naomi Rosenbaum

La diplomatie parlementaire n'est pas une forme inférieure de parlementarisme, mais plutôt une forme supérieure de diplomatie. Ses procédures sont celles des assemblées législatives d'Europe de l'Ouest, mais ses buts sont ceux des Etats en conflit. Les tentatives de formuler des résolutions sont particulièrement importantes en diplomatie parlementaire surtout parce que ce procédé favorise les échanges d'informations au sujet des intentions des nations. L'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies avec ses Commissions nous fournit l'exemple par excellence de la valeur de la diplomatie parlementaire.

Une étude de la première confrontation de Chypre avec les Nations Unies (1954–58) révèle comment une nation peut recevoir une information précieuse des Nations Unies qu'il lui serait impossible d'obtenir de tout autre source. Les votes et propositions des Etats-Unis à l'Assemblée Générale ainsi qu'à ses Commissions ont réussi à rendre claire la politique américaine au sujet de Chypre, là où les rencontres diplomatiques conventionnelles avaient failli. Le comportement relativement prudent de la Grèce à l'égard de Chypre semble résulter, en bonne partie, du fait qu'elle a appris qu'elle ne pouvait compter sur le support américain dans toute tentative ouverte pour fusionner Chypre à la Grèce.

La diplomatie parlementaire, à cause de la procédure des débats, force les chefs d'Etat à faire des propositions qui sont publiques et indéniables. Elle présente un défi constant à l'irrationalité et à l'imprécision. Les prévisions ayant trait aux comportements nationaux sont d'autant plus certaines. La diplomatie parlementaire tend ainsi à éliminer les erreurs de calcul de la nature de celles qui ont entraîné l'invasion de la Pologne et de la zone du Canal de Suez. Dans la mesure où les risques de guerre résultant d'erreurs de cette sorte sont réduits, l'équilibre mondial est plus certain.

sort of activity possible only in the United Nations.[3] In fact, the United Nations, acting under parliamentary conditions, can most usefully be considered as a continuous public exchange of information among the agents of the governments of the member nations. Although the exchange is framed as if its main task were only persuasion and development of consensus, its most important function is informative.

We can, of course, assume that nations do not in fact communicate meaningfully. We can say that they do not in fact receive and evaluate and act on

[3]Compare the formulation by Ernst Haas in "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," in Dale J. Hekhuis, Charles G. McClintock, and Arthur L. Burns, eds., *International Stability: Military, Economic and Political Dimensions* (New York, 1964), 232–3. In this piece Haas suggests that parliamentary diplomacy "mobilizes political mediatory forces—the uncommitted states, parties, groups, or persons—whose voice in the settlement process is given volume by the reluctance of the parties to the dispute to annoy the mediating forces." This is probably too optimistic.

notions about each others' intentions. Or if we wish to be a trifle less extreme, we can say that no such communication takes place through the United Nations, or that little regard is paid to such communication in the making of nations' plans. Still, if international communication and especially communication through the United Nations is a formal ritual, it is hard to understand why so many serious and, on the whole, sophisticated and intelligent men, of such widely varying backgrounds and national motivations, have been willing to carry it on at such wearying length. Some argument of more or less rational self-interest seems more plausible. It is not unreasonable to assume that the mass of something-like-communication that goes on, especially in the General Assembly and its committees, has in fact something to do with communication of valued messages. Validated by the context, these messages provide the leaders of nations with crucial information about the intentions of the other nations. The case of Cyprus will be used here to suggest how such information has been used by nations, and how the United Nations makes a characteristic contribution to world stability.[4]

In Cyprus's first encounter with the United Nations we can see both the general inadequacy of ordinary international communications and the contrasting usefulness of the United Nations.[5] Cyprus's case is a particularly illuminating one, since it had maximum contact both with normal international channels and with the activities of the United Nations.

I

The Cyprus dispute can be briefly summarized.[6] The issue was *enosis*, the mutual desire of the Greek Cypriot community and Greece that Cyprus become part of Greece. Britain, the colonial ruler of Cyprus, felt that her strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean could be satisfied only by continuing possession of the island, although four-fifths of the island's population was made up of enotist Greek Cypriots. Turkey also opposed *enosis* on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, which was one-fifth of the island's population. EOKA, a terrorist organization of Greek Cypriots, carried on a guerrilla war against the British in Cyprus, beginning in 1955, shortly after the United Nations refused to approve Greece's first formal request to have *enosis* endorsed under the rubric of self-determination of peoples. Turkish Cypriot fear of a British withdrawal added a threat of civil war. A war between Greece and Turkey also seemed possible. The United States and the Soviet Union were involved indirectly because Greece, Turkey, and Britain were members of NATO, and Cyprus was located in the strategic centre of

[4]Stability is seen as a prerequisite for progress, not as an alternative to it. See *ibid.*, esp. 9–15.
[5]Cyprus's second encounter with United Nations, begun in 1964, has been chiefly with the Security Council. Here attention is on problems which have already dislodged the precarious stability of the world.
[6]There is not yet a reliable account of the Cyprus struggle even until the 1959 settlement. A British-oriented account is succinctly presented in the British Information Services' pamphlet *Cyprus* (London, 1960) and a surprisingly objective pro-Cypriot account can be found in Doros Alastos's *Cyprus Guerilla* (London, 1960).

the eastern wing of NATO. From 1954 to 1958 the parties to the dispute quarrelled and bargained in every available international context, including the United Nations and NATO. "Quiet diplomacy" finally triumphed and the institution of the independent Republic of Cyprus was agreed to by Britain, Greece, Turkey, and (under pressure) the Cypriot communities in the London Agreement of February 1959. The settlement, of course, turned out to be far less permanent than hoped for, and the problems of Cyprus were back in the United Nations in less than five years.

Even the most optimistic observer cannot say that the United Nations solved the Cyprus problem or was responsible for the temporary solution of 1959. Resolution 1287 (XIII), which closed United Nations' action in the matter, indicated only that the organization was not prepared to endorse *enosis* and that it was glad the affair was being settled elsewhere.[7] Yet it is significant that Greek and Turkish leaders were able, just at the conclusion of United Nations' consideration, to meet and begin discussions that had at least a briefly fruitful result. In the vast mass of data that emerged in the United Nations there seems to have been, for Greece at least, a crucial message— about United States policy in this case—that she had apparently not received among the multiplicity of non-United Nations contacts on the subject of Cyprus.

One of the extraordinary things about the Cyprus dispute is the remarkable involvement of *all* international organizations and contacts. The data from traditional diplomacy compare in quantity with what was available through the United Nations. Greece, Great Britain, and Turkey seem to have been in communication on the subject in every way imaginable, and all three were informally in touch with the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus, with the United States, and with Russia. Some of these contacts we have reliable knowledge of; others we can infer. Bilateral conversations between Greece and Britain lasted from wartime until 1954, when a break of great personal bitterness between the Greek premier, Marshal Papagos, and Sir Anthony Eden, the British prime minister, preceded Greece's first submission of Cyprus to the United Nations.[8] In September 1955, Greece and Turkey met with Britain in a formal Tripartite Conference that was mainly concerned with Cyprus. This was broken off by anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir, which led to a session of the North Atlantic Council.[9] 1956–57 saw discussions between chiefly the British, the Cypriots, and the Greeks.[10] The North Atlantic Council considered Cyprus at intervals during the next three years, most notably in the summer and fall of 1958; at the latter time the secretary-general, M. Paul-Henri Spaak, attempted to mediate with a plan for settlement.[11] Lord Ismay as

[7]The substantive text of the resolution reads as follows: "[The General Assembly] Expresses its confidence that continued efforts will be made by the parties to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accord with the Charter of the United Nations." General Assembly Official Records, Thirteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 68, p. 19.
[8]Eden, *Memoirs, I, Full Circle* (London, 1960), 395–6, and Doros, *Cyprus Guerilla*, 41–2.
[9]C. M. Woodhouse, "Greece," *Annual Register 1955* (London, 1956), 263–5, and the British White Paper, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Cmd. 9594, *The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus* (London, Oct. 1955).
[10]Secretary of State for the Colonies, Cmd. 9708, *Correspondence exchanged between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios* (London, March 1956).
[11]Great Britain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Cmd. 455, *Discussion on Cyprus in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization September-October, 1958* (London, Oct. 1958).

secretary-general of NATO had offered to mediate in March 1957, and at the
North Atlantic Council meeting held in December of the same year President
Eisenhower attempted to intervene.[12] Two or more of the main parties to
the dispute met repeatedly in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe, in the meetings of the Organization of the European Economic Com-
munity, and in meetings of the members of the Baghdad Pact (later
CENTO).[13] We have considerable evidence that these regular contacts were
used deliberately to cover bilateral and trilateral discussions, as in the final
series of meetings that produced the London Settlement. The Earl of Avon
gives a detailed account of the elaborate network of consultation accompanying
attempts at negotiation in 1954–55, and we can reasonably assume that this
complexity of communication was typical.[14]

Yet as late as December 1958, when the Cyprus settlement was imminent,
observers saw no progress.[15] And a few incidents suggest that no clear messages
of intention were coming through. The last British governor of Cyprus has
noted the surprise of the British when a proposal thought to be too pro-Turk
for Greek acceptance was rejected by the Turks.[16] A former member of the
Greek Foreign Office notes that the Greeks never took Turkish commitment
with thorough seriousness; a crucial minute was even "lost."[17] Even more
important, the attitudes of the United States remained unclear. The American
ambassador to Greece both shocked *and* surprised the British and the Turks
alike by expressing "sympathetic regrets" at the British deportation of the
leader of the Greek Cypriot community.[18] The whole Suez imbroglio displays
the low level of communication within the NATO group during the period
of the Cyprus problem; it is not a coincidence that the month of Suez was the
worst month of the Cyprus rebellion.

Outside of the United Nations, patterns of policy do not seem to have
emerged clearly, nor were there any indications of the point when the policy
changes occurred that made an end to the long struggle possible. Both the
British governor of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot terrorist general have
noted in their memoirs that at the end of 1958 they saw no real hope for a
solution, and they had only vague ideas of the issues that the disputing parties
took seriously in their considerations for future policy. Both also noted that,

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[12]Max Beloff, *New Dimensions in Foreign Policy* (London, 1961), 74. Beloff is inclined
to give NATO a good deal of credit for the solution of the Cyprus problem.
[13]London *Times*, Jan. 17, 19, and 23 and Feb. 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 12, 1959.
[14]Eden, *Memoirs*, I, 398, 404 and 405.
[15]On December 11 after the (secret) beginning of talks, the lead editorial in the *Times*
was talking only of "Another Chance," and in gloomy tones.
[16]Sir Hugh Foot, *A Start in Freedom* (London, 1964), 164.
[17]Panayotis Pipinelis, "The Greco-Turkish Feud Revived," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII,
no. 2 (Jan. 1958), 313.
[18]*New York Times*, March 13, 1956. We might compare here General Grivas's rage as head
of EOKA at *Greece's* relatively restrained response to the act. Charles Foley, ed., *Memoirs
of General Grivas* (London 1964), 65. Pipinelis gives a relevant account of Greek ideas
about America's strategic valuation of Greece and Turkey. "The Greco-Turkish Feud
Revived," 311. And for the objective line-up of Greek and Turkish military strength,
assumed by all to be relevent in American decisions, see the Institute for Strategic Studies,
"The Military Strength of the U.S.S.R. and the NATO Powers," *Political Quarterly*, XXXI,
no. 1 (Jan.-March 1960), 71–88.

though they were informed and even directly involved in the more conventional diplomatic discussions, they were relatively out of touch with developments at the United Nations.[19]

In the United Nations, by contrast, pictures of policy can be found. Even more important, a single but vitally important break or change in policy stands out. General Assembly procedure is such that for any problem considered an astonishing amount of comment is elicited. In the course of this any nation concerned may have as many as six separate occasions to make a statement on any issue.[20] In spite of, or perhaps because of, repetition,[21] the passage of time, and the change of representatives, British policy comes through clearly enough as regards its basic consideration: "The sovereignty of the island is now vested in us. It is our responsibility to safeguard the peace and well-being of the Cypriots. The island is important to us from a military point of view so that we shall be able to fulfill our military obligations."[22] Such a clear and authoritative statement as this does not seem to have been available to under-cover negotiators. Similarly, we find the following statement of Turkish policy: "My country is concerned because of the immediate proximity of the Turkish mainland [to Cyprus] and because part of its population is Turkish."[23] And in 1954, the representative of Greece, asking for United Nations pressure on Britain wrote: "Cyprus is a Greek island. . . ."[24] He went on to argue for *enosis* as the appropriate form of self-determination. But in 1958 Greece shifted her policy to a demand for the following: "the independence of Cyprus, under the guarantee of the United Nations after a period of self-government."[25] We can trace the movement of Greece away from *enosis* through her United Nations statements. The dramatic final break comes at approximately the time of the statement just quoted, following a change in United States policy, a policy whose general line and whose shift showed clearly in the United Nations when it was not clear in any other way.

Greece could see from the United Nations debates that both Britain and Turkey were, in 1958, following essentially the same policy as in 1954. Their behaviour was predictable, the same as it had been for the last five years. The United States, however, over the same period, had shown only a sort of neutrality that Greece was willing to interpret as toleration of *enosis*. The

[19]Foot, *A Start in Freedom*, 177, and Grivas, *Memoirs*, 178–85.
[20]On each of the following occasions an interested member will be able to make at least one statement: During the General Debate, in a (written) request for placement on the Agenda (or supplement or reply to such a request), in the General Committee hearing on the request, during the Assembly discussion of the General Committee's Agenda recommendations, in the Committee of referral, and finally when the Committee reports to the Plenary Session. The Committee discussion is the lengthiest, but especially on a matter's first appearance before the Assembly, each stage is likely to include lengthy arguments and counter-arguments. In addition, every vote (and one is possible at all but the first two stages) may be given a substantial "explanation."
[21]In 1955, the Assembly voted not to place the question of Cyprus on the Agenda, but there had been considerable discussion both in the General Committee and in the Assembly. In 1954, 1956, 1957, and 1958 procedure was as indicated in n. 20.
[22]*General Assembly Official Records*, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Session, 758th Meeting (Sept. 25, 1958), 148.
[23]*Ibid.*, 756th Meeting (Sept. 24, 1958), 119.
[24]*Ibid.*, Ninth Session, Annexes, United Nations Document A/2703, p. 1, sec. 1.
[25]*Ibid.*, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Session, 769th Meeting (Oct. 3, 1958), 314.

United States, and her more faithful followers, had abstained on all crucial votes in the United Nations. Outside the United Nations, as we have noted, the United States had attempted to mediate, but left uncertain the balance of official American sympathies between the Greco-American community and military involvement with Turkey. In the Committee sessions in 1958, however, the United States moved with majestic dignity to vote against *enosis*.[26] Greece must henceforth have substituted expectation of active opposition for the previous assumption of neutrality on the part of a power whose tolerance was necessary for any Greek action. In the United Nations the United States, over a period of years, stated explicitly its neutrality in a dispute where its other actions indicated divided sympathies. And in the United Nations came an unambiguous indication when that intention of neutrality ended.

This is not to say that the United Nations causes regularities of behaviour, whether peaceful or not. Nor is it to say that a break in pattern in the United Nations causes a direct change in the "real" world outside. The General Assembly statements do no more than indicate policy intentions. But awareness of such intentions may be crucial for future policy of other states. It was *Greek* policy, both in and out of the United Nations, that was affected by the available indicators of present and future *United States* policy. The consequent change in behaviour was Greece's, as she abandoned a plan of action that she had thought possible as long as the United States seemed likely to tolerate it. Now a reliable message arrived, and must be taken into account. Greece now could not avoid making an accurate prediction of American response to *enosis*.[27] The sort of prediction involved is not strictly that of the social scientist, who claims foresight only as to probable regularities of behaviour among members of a group. We are beginning to speculate on the reasons of such regularities, and on the ways in which they may be reproduced or even altered. But what the diplomat needs to know is when the regularities will fail—when the statistically insignificant will occur. The social scientist can legitimately predict only the infrequency with which it will take place. Two world wars or even three in a hundred years are not a very ample source of data about the causes of world wars in modern times, but they are a more than adequate source of world disturbance or even world destruction. A reasonably experienced diplomat, with the usual resources, does not ordinarily need instructing about what a country is likely to do in the light of its history, resources, alliances, ideology, leaders, and so on.[28] He can use—and can get in the United Nations as in all his international contacts—data which will make his view of the world conform more closely to reality. What the diplomat needs

[26]*Ibid.*, Thirteenth Session, First Committee, 1000th Meeting (December 4, 1958), 312.
[27]Of course, the prediction of international reaction will be only one of many elements entering into a policy decision. It may, however—as it seems to have been in the case of Greece's actions about Cyprus—be a crucial element, tipping the balance decisively. (For an interesting schematization of the sorts of influences that set the stage for a decision, see James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill., 1966), esp. Table 2 on p. 48).
[28]Karl W. Deutsch has some interesting remarks to make about the possibility of a "professional diplomat with long residence abroad" being able to "predict from familiarity." *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 86–7.

most of all, however, is reliable indicators of the circumstances under which other countries will act "differently," as he knows they will sometimes. It is chiefly these "different" acts, not consistent with the deduced patterns of behaviour, that inject the risks into international relations.[29]

It has been argued that the major disturbances of international peace in this century have been due precisely to series of miscalculations of national intentions, due in part to crucial failures of communication. Hitler, for instance, seems to have failed to realize that Great Britain would indeed fight over Poland though she had not over Austria or Czechoslovakia.[30] The Treaty of Versailles and the treaties following it can be interpreted as attempts to demarcate points at which a new sort of behaviour (forcible rebuff of German expansion) could be expected. A chain of episodes, beginning with the reoccupation of the Rhineland, showed the meaninglessness of these indicators and their glosses in diplomatic conference and commentary. The inadequacies of the League emptied it of meaning in turn, and no clear messages ever emerged.[31] The post-war world has at least the facilities of the United Nations. And prediction, in the diplomats' if not in the social scientists' sense, becomes fractionally more possible. The General Assembly provides in fact the appropriate facilities for increasing the type of communication on which, in turn, prediction must rely.

II

We can think of communication among nations as liable to be distorted in three areas—at the point of output, in transit, and at the point of reception. The process of transmission always distorts a message to some degree,[32] but presumably even here the parliamentary activities in the General Assembly, operating over time, would help to clarify by the mere fact of providing series of messages on the same topic, as well as by the question-and-answer procedure of debate. In this connection, also, the fact of the messages being made in public and being a matter of record would help in clearing out accidental mistakes or ambiguities. More interesting, though, and more serious, are the distortions imposed upon messages by the passions of speaker and hearer; the desires to impress or to persuade or to intimidate, or the corresponding desires to be reassured or confirmed in a chosen course of action. In bilateral communication such representations and misinterpretations can have maximum

[29]For a very useful statement of similar notions about prediction, see Charles K. McClintock, Dale J. Hekhuis, Arthur L. Burns, and Robert C. Tucker, "A Pragmatic Approach to International Stability," in Hekhuis *et al*, eds., *International Stability*, esp. notes 7 and 8, pp. 13–15.

[30]See for instance Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems," *American Political Science Review*, LIX, no. 3 (Sept. 1965), 589–60. Mr. Dinerstein discusses in passing the second phase of the Cyprus problem (from 1963 on) but seems to oversimplify the relationship of Greece and Turkey with the United States.

[31]See Anthony Eden, *Memoirs*, II, *Facing the Dictators* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), *passim* for mutual international incomprehension, and Eden's conclusion (p. 689): "nor did the dictatorships believe in the will of the democracies to act as they had pledged."

[32]See Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York, 1963), esp. 148–50.

effect. But in the multilateral open communications that take place in the United Nations, the elements tend, to a certain but highly useful extent, to cancel each other out. Greece, for instance, addresses Turkey with the intention of showing her implacable hostility to partitioning Cyprus. She addresses Britain in terms that emphasize anti-colonialism and threat of civil war in Cyprus. For the colonial bloc Greece speaks of her link with the Arab powers and of Britain's Great Power role in the Middle East. She calls on the United States as the location of a Greek colony, on the Soviet Union as anti-imperialist. None of these themes is common in Greek policy, but they share with Greek policy in general an underlying commitment to Greater Greece and concern for the hellenism of Cyprus and future *enosis*. The message—Greek support of *enosis*—came through with sufficient clarity to be responsible for Greece's ultimate defeat in the United Nations, and for the change in United States policy that in turn caused Greece to acquiesce in a non-enotist settlement for Cyprus. The swarm of messages, directed in a single forum to a number of sources, tended to clarify each others' strategic obscurities. In conjunction, the texts could be decoded, and were.

In the General Assembly the relevant communications have three important characteristics: (1) deliberate conscious publicity or openness; (2) continuousness, not tied to occasion; and (3) the widest possible audience.[33] These are just the qualities that so often disturb observers of the debates and discussions in the United Nations. These characteristics explain that unspontaneity, inflexibility, and calculated nature of United Nations statements which makes them appear insincere and uninformative. Yet it seems possible that such statements actually gain from the setting and the premeditation. What a nation says in the General Assembly is what it says when it is concerned to create images and expectations.[34] It can be assumed that omissions and ambiguities are deliberate. If he discounts for attempts to present the most ingratiating aspects of national intentions, a knowledgeable observer can construct a useful idea of the intention itself.[35] The open back-and-forth nature of the parliamentary style debate reduces fraud and misrepresentation. The conditions of debate put a premium on accuracy.[36] To be sure, very much less is said, but what is said is intended to resist immediate public challenge

[33]The argument of this paper, of course, supports universal membership and participation in the General Assembly, especially for hostile powers who would not otherwise meet except in the parliamentary-style regional international organizations, where membership is based on at least partial shared interest.

[34]The members of the Soviet bloc limit the legitimacy of the United Nations to just such formally stated and sanctioned governmental acts. See Wojciech Morawiecki, "Some Problems Connected with the Organs of International Organization," *International Organization*, XIX, no. 4, (Autumn 1965), 913–28. This suggests that their obvious appreciation of the organization (inferred from their continued participation) may be based on an argument similar to this paper's.

[35]See Alexander E. George, *Propaganda Analysis* (Evanston, 1959), on the whole problem of deliberately slanted messages.

[36]See, for instance, the rather heated exchange about population statistics for Cyprus, between M. Zorlu for Turkey and M. Averoff-Tossizza for Greece, *General Assembly Official Records*, Thirteenth Session, First Committee, 997th and 998th Meetings (Nov. 26 and 27, 1958), 256, 258, 259.

by skilled and hostile opponents—and for that reason it is worth taking seriously.

In fact, many of the customary problems of diplomacy are lessened by this "parliamentary diplomacy." The credentials of the spokesmen—their ability to represent the views of their principals, and, especially, to bind these principals—is less in doubt in the United Nations than in the majority of more-or-less confidential discussions. The agents in the United Nations can make commitments under only very limited and formally defined conditions—not independently but only under explicit instruction. The result is very little commitment, but a great deal of useful knowledge about the sort of commitment that will not be made, and the reasons for it.[37] Problems of reliability, a plague to both diplomats and researchers, all but disappear when all statements are made on explicit authority and in public.

The frequent separation of utterance from specific occasion is also useful, just as it is also deplored by critics of the United Nations. The General Debate swings round year after year, and Greece, for example, rises to make a statement seemingly prompted only by the season. And from 1951 until 1958, nearly every year she referred to Cyprus, either directly or indirectly. Surely this was either inflammatory or superfluous? Yet for the Greek leaders, harassed on both sides by parliamentary opposition at home, and under hostile Turkish surveillance, this meant that, every year, without the invidious necessity of looking for an excuse, a public statement on Cyprus could be made under relatively uncontroversial auspices. And in 1958, a year of near civil war in Cyprus, M. Christian Palamas was able to indicate Greek willingness to accept a new form of self-determination for Cyprus.[38] The Greek ambassador to the United Nations, instead of the prime minister and foreign minister, became the spokesman for Greece; this was itself an important indicator of lessening Greek intransigence. And the implied retreat could both get by and get through in the muffling flow of the General Debate, as it probably could not have anywhere else. A flow of comment extending over years mutes the emphasis of any one remark, often a good thing. More, it shows a pattern of interests and of responses, which may be most useful when it changes enough to make a future break in behaviour predictable.

The parliamentary style of activity is also, of course, accompanied in the United Nations by the whole round of traditional informal soundings and discussions. These range, for example, from the meeting of the Greek, Turkish, and British ambassadors to the United Nations that in 1958 started progress

[37]John G. Hadwen and Johan Kaufman write that "a governmental position stated in detail and in public becomes difficult and frequently impossible to change, whereas in private negotiations there is less need for 'face-saving.' An individual can withdraw an opinion he has expressed. It is more difficult for a government." *How United Nations Decisions are Made* (Leyden, 1960), 54. This intended criticism of public statements seen as *negotiation* suggests their value as *information* which cannot be denied or withdrawn.

[38]*General Assembly Official Records*, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Session, 769th Meeting (Oct. 3, 1958), 311–15. Greece's request for inscription that session confirmed the impression of the relatively moderate General Debate speech; it was a legalistic discussion of self-determination. *Ibid.*, Thirteenth Session, Annexes Agenda Item 68, United Nations Documents A/3874 and A/3974 Add. 1, Aug. 15 and Sept. 13, 1958.

towards a Cyprus settlement[39] to the "cocktail circuit" that commentators value so highly.[40] But these are on the one hand merely new examples of traditional practices, peculiar to the United Nations only in that this organization provides a better-than-usual shelter for rendezvous that might cause embarrassment if publicized. On the other hand, the predictive and transactional value of these activities is amorphous and disputable. All the old questions re-emerge —reliability, power to bind, and so on. The data supplied are "soft" even for the nations involved, whereas the public debate provides some data which, if very limited in quantity, can, as we have suggested, be considered "hard" enough to help make predictions. Multilateral communication that is permanent, open, and under rules of procedure requiring formal rationality is useful then in two ways: it clarifies messages directly addressed to a nation, and it intercepts a wide range of messages on topics concerning it which are not directly addressed to the nation. As a result, the nation has a more reliable indication of the intentions or predictable behaviour of other nations.[41]

Clearly these considerations will weigh more heavily on a nation that feels itself to be relatively low in power. A small power such as Greece must look for the approval or neutrality that makes action possible. Such a power must constantly seek allies, but even more be looking for a reliable indication of its future supporters, especially among the major powers or the significant groupings of minor ones. These are the nations which have been identified as "revolutionary" or revisionist, and which are likely in the immediate future to provide not the reasons but the occasions for disturbances of the peace.[42] These are the nations whose actions, under present conditions, seem to pose the main threats to international stability and even survival. It is not the Soviet Union who will start a war deliberately, but something like Greece's trying to absorb Cyprus, unaware that the United States will not allow any such act even in the name of self-determination of peoples.

Greece was unwontedly cautious throughout the whole Cyprus dispute. For instance, the Greek directors of the rebellion put substantial restrictions on EOKA[43] and at the height of the crisis the Royal Hellenic government allowed British planes to use Greek facilities in a way that enraged General Grivas on

[39]Foot, *A Start in Freedom*, 176–7.
[40]In a series of articles Mr. Chadwick Alger has discussed the less obvious influences on international relations of the parliamentary style activities of the United Nations. He suggests that the participating national leaders will experience changes in affiliation, style, and procedural preferences, and that a sort of "intergovernmental society" builds up around problems considered under such conditions. He is interested, however, chiefly in the more private side effects of parliamentary procedure on international relations—the more elusive and diffuse aspects, that have only an indirect impact on policy making. See his "Personal Contact in Intergovernmental Organizations," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., *International Behaviour* (New York, 1965), 546, and particularly his most general article on the subject, "Non-Resolution Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effect on International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V. no. 2 (June 1961), 126–45.
[41]See Karl W. Deutsch on "limit signals" about "limit probabilities," warnings of obstructions. *The Nerves of Government*, 212–13.
[42]Ernst Haas, "Dynamic Environment and Static System—Revolutionary Regimes in the United Nations," in Morton Kaplan, ed., *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York, 1962), esp. 267–8.
[43]Grivas, *Memoirs*, esp. 166, 186.

Cyprus.[44] We may note also how carefully all Greek statements were hedged in terms of "representing" the Greeks of Cyprus, and how very far from open intervention Greece remained even in the far uglier crisis of 1963–64.[45] Greece never committed unconsidered overt acts that might have provoked American reactions. It seems likely that Greece's uncharacteristic cautiousness and ultimate change of line depended on indications of American non-support— indications that she could not have obtained clearly except in the United Nations, and through "parliamentary diplomacy."

III

The term "parliamentary diplomacy" has been a disarmingly convenient one for students of international relations, aware that something different was going on at the United Nations. However, even as a foundation president, Mr. Rusk spoke in the accents less of a theorist than of a practitioner. He accordingly stressed the ways in which the United Nations is peculiar as a potential tool for the statesman, how it might on occasion possess advantages or disadvantages over, for example, bilateral negotiation or regional conference. The United Nations, seen from this viewpoint, was valuable because it provided a new technique.[46]

This is not the sort of use Mr. Rusk's term has received from political scientists. It has become the label and partial justification for attempts to discuss the United Nations (or at least the General Assembly) in an extended analogy to the parliamentary systems which have been studied so long.[47] Scholars and laymen have both also tended to judge the General Assembly in comparison with its presumed models, the western European legislative assemblies, basing hopes or fears for the future of the organization on diagnoses of the extent to which it can be seen as becoming more or less "parliamentary."[48] Such an analysis is surely behind the complaints that the United

[44]*Ibid.*, 65, 92, 170.

[45]Turkish jets buzzed and later bombed the island, but there was no Greek counter-attack. See *New York Times*, Dec. 1963, and Aug. 1964.

[46]Conor Cruise O'Brien employs Dean Rusk's term much as he does himself to describe using the special facilities of the General Assembly. "Conflicting Concepts of the United Nations," *The Correspondent*, no. 34 (Spring-Summer 1965), 23. See also Robert Murphy in *Diplomat among Warriors* (New York, 1965), 404, 412. O'Brien and Murphy are, of course, also professional diplomats.

[47]For instance, Robert McIver compares the eclipse of the Security Council by the General Assembly to "the process through which, in so many countries, the 'common' or representative body gradually enlarged its prerogatives over the 'upper house' or aristocratic council." *The Nations and the United Nations* (New York, 1960), 81.

[48]See, for example, Mr. Ernst Haas's criticism of the organization for its failure to "increase its legitimacy in the eyes of its members" or to achieve "systemic autonomy," and his use of resolutions and votes as indications of lack of progress in these respects. The indices are very parliamentary and the suggestion is of a parliamentary model. ("Dynamic Environment and Static System," esp. 281, 305, and 307). Other scholars who discuss the United Nations as a sort of failed Concert of Powers or collective security system nevertheless are likely to find the organization's one redeeming feature to be the partial creation of a world wide consensus through the (parliamentary) debates in the General Assembly. For example,

Nations cannot "do"[49] anything, and behind the recurrent demand for revision of the voting procedure of the organization so that "meaningful" resolutions can be voted and enforced.[50]

It is clear enough that the General Assembly is a very odd sort of parliament. We have only to ask the familiar questions about the identity of the constituents, the interests being conciliated, the resources to be distributed, the consensus to be created, the machinery of enforcement.[51] Even to attempt answers for the United Nations we must personify the nations, always a dangerous exercise, or we must play games with metaphors about "representation" or "world public opinion."[52] At best the result is highly unsatisfactory, and we are likely to conclude that the United Nations is not just odd, but a disastrous failure.

A major source of difficulties here is perhaps a mistaken choice of categories, based in part on stressing the adjective over the noun in Mr. Rusk's formula. After all, "parliamentary" does modify "diplomacy." In an abstract discussion of parliaments it might be useful to imagine an extreme case in which the participants completely lacked freedom of action, in an exaggeration of the "instructed" delegate with a restrictive mandate. Similarly, it might be useful to imagine limiting cases where both the legislative and the executive power were forbidden to the assembly as such, where minority assent could be assumed to be absent, where "laws" had no authority and could not be enforced. A case combining all these extremes is theoretically possible, but if it were not for the existence of the General Assembly we would say that it was not practically realizable. In fact, parliamentary-oriented criticism of the institution is saying something similar—that this is such a freakish parliament that it cannot survive let alone perform any significant function.

But suppose we shift our viewpoint, and consider the United Nations'

Inis L. Claude, Jr., ends a careful analysis of possible functions of an international "Great Debate" with praise of the "process of deliberation" as part of the means to achieve "the kind of order for which decent men yearn." *Swords into Plowshares* (New York, 1964).

[49]This is also a standard complaint about national legislatures, but they of course have compensating powers of "control of government activity" that are meaningless when translated to the United Nations. See Inter-Parliamentary Union, *Parliaments: A Comparative Study on Structure and Function of Representative Institutions in Forty-One Countries* (New York, 1963), esp. 398.

[50]For instance, Senator J. William Fulbright says that the General Assembly "bears no relationship to the realities of world power. A body in which Guatemala or Bulgaria exercises the same voting power as the United States or the Soviet Union can scarcely be expected to serve as a reliable instrument of peace enforcement or even of consultation." Robert Theobald, ed., *The United Nations Reconsidered* (New York, 1955), 63.

[51]Recently we have seen a number of interesting attempts to apply to international organizations some of the analytical methods newly developed for the study of national legislatures and party systems. For instance, see Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven, 1965). The authors find that distinct limits are set on their work by failures of resemblance between national and international politics (see 148–9 and 280–90, especially the implications of n. 16 on p. 290).

[52]The effort to use this notion of world public opinion along with the customary parliamentary pattern of majority/minority decision leads to some odd contortions, as when a Greek analysis of votes about Cyprus drew a distinction between a "majority in the formal sense," and "the formal majority or the . . . majority of consciences." *General Assembly Official Records*, Tenth Session, Plenary Session, 521st Meeting (Sept. 23, 1955), 53. The vote in question had been seven ayes, four nays, four abstentions.

parliamentary style of activities under the rubric of diplomacy, as Mr. Rusk did originally.[53] The proper functions would then be diplomatic, the basis of criticizing it would then be some standard of international order rather than of national politics. The United Nations supplies a highly superior sort of diplomacy rather than an inferior brand of legislation, precisely because its forms and practices are those of the western European legislative assembly. The parliamentary form of these activities is indeed important, but because it is the necessary precondition of the organization's major contribution to a certain form of international communication. The General Assembly is important because it is where nations interact as such, as the "autonomous sub-units"[54] of the international system existing today. The world community is developing, either above or below the level of international relations, through the cross-national or super-national activities of national and international agencies. The parliamentary-style activities are ones which cannot change the nature of nations. But these activities can help national leaders to make their calculations of other nations' intentions.

The United Nations has not been notably successful in encouraging nations to love peace, but it has surely been able to make clearer to them what acts are likely to provoke a breach of the peace. Whatever the Charter says, the nations are not "peace-loving"—but for international stability of a minimal sort it is useful that they are willing to act *as if* they loved peace, to that degree which will allow them to participate in the parliamentary-style activities of the United Nations. The result is that the whole international scene is fractionally but significantly more like what it would be if the nations did in fact love peace and one another. This is not to say that when the nations are talking they are not fighting. It is to say that talking in a certain place, to a certain audience, under certain rules of procedure, enables the nations to communicate about certain crucial political probabilities. Conflict arising from miscalculation is thus less likely, and international stability is more probable.

[53]Hans Morgenthau gives a criticism of parliamentary diplomacy in which three out of the four points amount to decrying its more "parliamentary" aspects. However, he notes the defects and not the values of "publicity," in spite of an appreciation of classical diplomacy that fits well with the virtues I see in the parliamentary version. *Politics among Nations* (New York, 1948), 431–45.
[54]Alger, "Non-Resolution Consequences," 130.