Chapter 9

Ethnic Minorities

Some of the most intractable problems facing democracies concern the management of ethnic conflict. The familiar litany of problems ranges from the inclusion of diverse racial groups in South Africa and Namibia to long-standing tensions between Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland, violence in the Basque region, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Balkans, and the dramatic civil wars that occurred in Rwanda, Kashmir, and East Timor. Ethnic identities can be best understood as social constructs with deep cultural and psychological roots based on national, cultural-linguistic, racial, or religious backgrounds[1]. They provide an affective sense of belonging and are socially defined in terms of their meaning for the actors, representing ties of blood, soil, faith and community. Agencies concerned with the peaceful amelioration of such antagonisms have increasingly turned towards 'constitutional engineering' or 'institutional design' to achieve these ends. The aim has been to develop electoral rules of the game structuring political competition so that actors have in-built incentives to accommodate the interests of different cultural groups, leading to conflict management, ethnic cooperation, and long-term political stability.

One of the most influential accounts in the literature is provided by the theory of 'consociational' or 'consensus' democracy developed by Arend Lijphart which suggests that the institutional arrangements, particularly the type of electoral system, can maintain stable governments despite countries being deeply divided into distinct ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural communities[2]. Consociational systems are characterized by institutions facilitating co-operation and compromise among political leaders, maximizing the number of 'winners' in the system, so that separate communities can peacefully coexist within the common borders of a single nation-state. Electoral systems represent perhaps the most powerful instrument available for institutional engineering, with far-reaching consequences for party systems, the composition of legislatures, and the durability of democratic arrangements[3]. As we have seen, majoritarian electoral systems systematically exaggerate the parliamentary lead for the party in first place, to secure a decisive outcome and government accountability, thereby excluding smaller parties from the division of spoils. By contrast, proportional electoral systems lower the hurdles for smaller parties, maximizing their inclusion into the legislature and ultimately into coalition governments. Consociational theories suggest that proportional electoral systems are most likely to facilitate accommodation between diverse ethnic groups, making them more suitable for transitional and consolidating democracies struggling to achieve legitimacy and stability in plural societies.

These are important claims that, if true, have significant consequences. To explore the evidence for these arguments, Part I of this study summarizes the key assumptions in consociational theories of democracy and outlines the central propositions examined in this study. Part II describes the research design and methods. Evidence from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems facilitates comparison of political attitudes and behavior among a diverse range of ethnic minorities including the Russian-speaking population living in the Ukraine, residents in the Catalan, Galician and Basque regions in Spain, African-Americans in the United States, the Arab/Muslim populations in Israel, the Scots and Welsh in Britain, the Hungarian minority in Rumania, the mainland Chinese in Taiwan, and the Maoris in New Zealand. Part III defines and analyzes the primary ethnic cleavages in each of these societies, and tests the central propositions about the effects of electoral systems on differences in minority-majority support. The results suggest a complex relationship between the basic type of electoral system and majority-minority differences in system support. In particular, the study throws doubt on the claim that PR party list systems automatically generate higher levels of system support among ethnic minorities. The conclusion considers the lessons of these findings for issues of effective electoral designs and conflict mediation through

constitutional engineering.

The Theoretical Framework

The central issue examined in this chapter derives from Arend Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy, in particular the claim that PR systems are more effective at engendering support for the political system among ethnic minorities. The core argument is that, in contrast to majoritarian electoral systems, PR (i) produces a more proportional outcome, (ii) this facilitates the entry of smaller parties into parliament, (iii) this includes the election of ethnic minority parties, and in turn (iv) this produces greater diffuse support for the political system among ethnic minority populations (see Figure 9.1). Although widely influential, the existing evidence for some of these claims is limited and remains controversial.

| Proportionality of Votes: Seats | Parliamentary inclusion of smaller parties | Parliamentary inclusion of ethnic minority parties | Greater ethnic minority support for the political system |

(i) Proportionality

The first claim is that majoritarian electoral systems are less proportional in translating votes into seats. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, considerable evidence supports this proposition. This study confirms the general patterns established in the literature[4]. Using the Gallagher index, Lijphart compared parliamentary elections from 1945-1996 in 36 democracies and found that the average electoral disproportionality under PR systems ranged from 1.30 (in the Netherlands) to 8.15 (in Spain), and in majoritarian-plurality systems ranged from 9.26 (Australia) to 21.08 (France)[5]. Lijphart concluded that disproportionality was the product of district magnitude (the number of members elected per district) combined with the 'effective threshold' (that is, the minimum level of votes which a party needs to gain seats)[6].

(ii) The Inclusion of Smaller Parties

The second claim is that more proportional electoral systems *lower the barriers for the parliamentary representation of any political minority,* whatever their background or ideological persuasion, if groups seek to mobilize and contest elections. Although the association between electoral systems and multipartyism is weaker than that between electoral systems and disproportionality, Chapter 4 established that more parties are usually elected under PR than under majoritarian elections. Lijphart's comparison of 36 established democracies from 1945-96 found that the level of disproportionality in the electoral system was negatively related to the effective number of parties elected to the lower houses of parliament (r=-.50 p.01)[7]. Katz concluded that PR is associated with greater party competition, including the election of a wider range of parties across the ideological spectrum.[8]

(iii) The Inclusion of Ethnic Minority Parties

By lowering the electoral barrier to smaller parties, it is claimed that PR thereby increases the opportunities for any ethno-political minority to enter parliament if they want to organize as a party and run for office. In plural societies with strong cleavages, consociational arrangements in general, and PR systems in particular, are believed to facilitate minority representation. As Lijphart argues: "*In the most deeply divided societies, like Northern Ireland, majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy. What such societies need is a democratic regime that*

emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of being satisfied with a bare majority."[9]

Yet the evidence for the relationship between the electoral system and ethnic representation remains limited and controversial. Systematic comparative data on ethnic minorities is plagued by problems of operationalization and measurement, due to the diversity of ethno-national, ethno-religious and ethno-linguistic cleavages in different societies. Rather than examining direct indicators, both Lijphart and Taagepeera argue that we can generalize from the proportion of women in elected office as a proxy indicator of minority representation in general[10]. The previous chapter confirmed greater female representation under PR party lists than under majoritarian electoral systems[11]. But is it legitimate to generalize from the representation of women to the representation of ethnic minorities? In fact, there are reasons why this strategy may prove misleading. Ethnic minorities are often clustered geographically within certain areas, such as the British Asian community in Leicester or African Americans in New York, allowing local gains in particular constituencies in majoritarian electoral systems even within heterogeneous plural societies. By contrast, the male-to-female ratio is usually fairly uniform in distribution across different constituencies, except in a few retirement areas. Moreover the use of positive action strategies including candidate quotas or reserved seats often differ considerably in the opportunities they provide for women and ethnic minorities. And we also know that, at least in Britain, women and ethnic-racial minorities face different types of discriminatory attitudes among selectors and electors[12].

Considerable debate also surrounds how far generalizations about the workings of electoral systems in plural societies within established democracies can be extended to the management of ethnic tensions in transitional and consolidating democracies. Much existing research on consociational democracies is based on the experience of West European political systems that, by virtue of their very persistence, have come to a shared consensus about many of the basic constitutional rules of the game and a democratic culture. The classic exemplars of plural democracies are the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium. But it may prove difficult to generalize from the context of stable and affluent post-industrial societies, with institutional arrangements and a liberal democratic culture of tolerance which has evolved throughout the twentieth century, to the process of conflict-management in transitional democracies struggling with the triple burden of socioeconomic development, the consolidation of the political system, and the global pressures of the world market. Only limited cross-national survey research has analyzed these issues in countries where ethnic politics is often regarded as particularly critical, such as in Africa[13]. Some older examples of consociational democracies in developing societies, like the Lebanon and Malaysia, have had a mixed record of success[14].

The growing literature on newer democracies remains divided on this issue. Sisk and Reynolds argue that PR systems have generally been most effective in mitigating ethnic conflict in culturally-plural African societies, by facilitating the inclusion of minorities in parliament and encouraging 'balanced' lists. But this process is contingent upon multiple factors, notably the degree to which ethnicity is politicized, the depth and intensity of ethnic conflict, and the stage of democratization reached by a country, the territorial distribution and concentration of ethnic groups, and the use of positive action strategies in the selection and election process[15]. Saideman et al used pooled time-series data from the Minorities at Risk dataset and found that PR tends to reduce ethnic conflict[16]. By contrast, Tsebelis suggests that, although PR is useful in gaining agreement to a new constitution during the initial transition from authoritarian rule, in the longer term proportional arrangements may serve to reinforce and perpetuate rigid segregation along narrow ethnic-cultural, religious and linguistic cleavages, rather than promoting a few major catchall parties that gradually facilitate group cooperation within parties[17]. Barkan argues that the cases of Namibia and South Africa show that parties representing ethnic

minorities are not necessarily penalized by majoritarian systems[18]. Taagepera warns of the dangers of PR producing extreme multipartyism and fragmentation, which may promote instability in new democracies[19]. Since much of this work is based on country-specific case studies it remains hard to say how far we can generalize more widely, for example whether power-sharing arrangements in the new South Africa would work if transplanted to Angolan or Nigerian soil, let alone exported further afield to the Ukraine or the Balkans. The unintended consequences of electoral reforms - evident even in the cases of Italy, Japan, Israel and New Zealand - illustrate how constitutional engineering remains more art than science[20].   Given all these important considerations, and continuing debate in the literature, we need more evidence to understand the electoral fortunes of ethnic minority parties under majoritarian and proportional electoral systems.

(iv) The Impact on Specific and Diffuse Support for the Political System

The last, and perhaps the most controversial and important claim of consociational theory, is that by facilitating the inclusion of ethnic minority parties into parliament, PR systems increase mass-level ethnic minority support for the political system. Lijphart argues that political minorities are persistent electoral losers in majoritarian systems, excluded from representative institutions in successive contests, thereby reducing their faith in the fairness of the electoral outcome and eroding their diffuse support for the democratic system in general. "*Especially in plural societies – societies that are sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines into virtually separate sub-societies with their own political parties, interest groups, and media or communication – the flexibility necessary for majoritarian democracy is absent. Under these conditions, majority rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous, because minorities that are continually denied access to power will feel excluded and discriminated against and will lose their allegiance to the regime.*"[21] In contrast under PR, because representatives from ethnic minority parties are incorporated within parliaments and coalition governments, consociational theory assumes that their supporters will gradually come to feel that they have more of a say in the policymaking process, so that minorities will become more satisfied with the fairness of the outcome of specific contests, and more supportive at diffuse level of the electoral system and the democratic rules of the game. Under PR, minorities should display more positive attitudes towards the political system because no group that can mobilize electoral support is systematically excluded from elected office on a persistent basis. Political leaders will learn to collaborate together within parliaments through deliberation, negotiation and compromise, it is hoped, encouraging conciliation among their grassroots supporters.

Yet there is little direct evidence about the impact of electoral systems on cultural attitudes, such as satisfaction with democracy and support for the political system. Census data about the electorate can be aggregated at district or regional level to analyze ethnic minority voting patterns, for example Horowitz used this approach to examine election results in Guyana, Trinidad, Congo, Ghana and India[22]. Blais and Carty compared over 500 elections across twenty nations to demonstrate greater voter participation in PR than in majoritarian electoral systems[23]. The main limitation with aggregate data is that we cannot establish how minority groups felt about the available electoral choices or the fairness of the electoral system[24]. If the rules of the game mean that some groups are systematically organized into politics, and others are systematically organized out, ideally we need to understand not just how groups voted, but also how they regard democracy and the political system.

Some light on this issue comes from a study by Anderson and Guillory that compared satisfaction with democracy among consensual and majoritarian political systems in eleven EU member states[25]. They hypothesized that (i) system support would be consistently influenced by whether people were among the winners and losers in electoral contests, defined by whether the party they supported was returned to government; and (ii) that this process would be mediated by the type of democracy. The

study found that in majoritarian democracies, winners expressed far higher satisfaction with democracy than losers, whereas consociational systems produced a narrower gap between winners and losers. This approach is valuable but it is confined to Western Europe, it does not allow us to distinguish many national-level factors that may co-vary with the political systems in these nations, such as their historical culture and traditions, nor does it allow us to distinguish the impact of electoral systems per se from other institutional variables.

Expanding upon Anderson and Guillory, in an earlier study I examined the impact of electoral systems upon confidence in representative institutions by comparing a wider range of twenty-five established and new democracies, using the 1990-3 World Values Survey. Using regression models controlling for social background, levels of democratization, and socio-economic development, the study found that, contrary to expectation, institutional confidence was generally higher among respondents living in countries using majoritarian rather than PR electoral systems[26]. In an alternative approach, using a single-nation 1993-96 panel study, Banducci, Donovan and Karp tested whether the move from a majoritarian to a proportional electoral system in New Zealand produced more positive attitudes towards the political system among supporters of minor party and the Maori population. The study found that after participating in the first Mixed Member Proportional election, supporters of the minor parties displayed greater increases in political efficacy (they were significantly more likely to see their votes as counting and to see voting as important) than the rest of the electorate, although there was no parallel increase in political trust: "*The lack of change on the main measure of trust in government is particularly striking, suggesting that the roots of distrust in government lie in something other than the rules used to translates votes into seats*."[27]

We can conclude that consociational theory makes strong claims for the virtues of PR in plural societies. Lijphart argues that consociational power-sharing arrangements, and particularly highly proportional PR electoral systems with low thresholds, are most likely to include ethno-political minorities within legislatures and coalition governments, thereby to promote support for democracy and cooperation between groups in states deeply divided by ethnic conflict. Yet this brief review of the literature suggests that the direct support for these claims remains mixed. The most convincing and systematic evidence, demonstrated in earlier chapters, concerns the impact of electoral systems upon the proportionality of the outcome and upon the inclusion of smaller parties within parliaments. In turn, under certain conditions, the inclusion of smaller parties in PR systems may influence the electoral fortunes of ethnic minority parties. But it remains an open question whether the inclusion of ethnic minority representatives leads to greater diffuse or specific support for the political system among ethnic minority groups in the electorate, such as stronger feelings of political efficacy, satisfaction with democracy, or trust in government. To go further we need to examine survey evidence measuring support for the political system among members of different minority communities. In Israel, for example, does the Arab community feel that they can influence the Knesset? In the Ukraine, does the Russian-speaking population regard the conduct of elections as free and fair? Does the Hungarian community and Roma (gypsy) groups living in Romania approve of the democratic performance of their political system? Are Basques and Catalans satisfied that their interests are represented through Spanish elections? It is to evidence about these matters that we now turn.

Testing Consociational Theory

Measuring Political Support & Core Hypotheses

What is the best way to measure the concept of 'support for the political system'? Elsewhere, building on the Eastonian framework, I have argued that this is essentially multidimensional and so cannot be tapped reliably using single measures, for example of political trust. This approach distinguishes between five levels of support ranging from the most abstract and diffuse level, measured by support for the political community like

the nation-state, down through support for democratic values, for the political regime, for political institutions, and for political actors. In this view, citizens can logically distinguish between levels, for example trusting their local representative and yet having little confidence in parliament as an institution, or approving of democratic ideals but still criticizing of the performance of their government, and so on[28].

Following this logic, four alternative indicators of political support were used for the analysis. Specific support was measured by perceptions of the *fairness of the electoral system*; the most direct evaluation of how well the election was seen to work. Responses to this could be colored by the outcome of the specific campaign under analysis, for example by the party that won office. Diffuse support, understood to indicate more general approval of the political system as a whole, was measured by general *satisfaction with the democratic process*. It would remain consistent to approve of how the last election worked and still to remain dissatisfied with how democracy performed in general, or vice versa. The diffuse sense that citizens could influence the political process was tapped by measures of *political efficacy.* Lastly, *voting turnout* was compared as a critical indicator of involvement in the specific election. Factor analysis (not reported here) revealed that these items fell into two principle dimensions: the 'approval' dimension meant that perceptions of the fairness of the electoral system were closely related to general satisfaction with democracy, while the 'participation' dimension meant that political efficacy was closely related to electoral turnout. Details of the items used in the analysis are listed under Table 9.4.

Survey evidence provides direct insights into political attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy or feelings of political efficacy but at the same time it remains difficult to compare ethnic minorities directly across a diverse range of societies. Multiple factors can influence specific and diffuse levels of support for the political system, including perceptions of government performance, cultural values, and general levels of interpersonal trust and social capital, as well as the standard predictors of political attitudes at individual-level, such as age, education, class and gender[29]. Even with suitable controls, given a limited range of countries it becomes impossible to isolate and disentangle the impact of the electoral system from all these other factors.

Yet what we can compare is the *relative* gap in majority-minority political support within each nation. Given the existence of social and political disparities within every democracy, in general we would expect to find that ethnic minorities would prove more negative than majority populations, for example that African-Americans would be more cynical about the fairness of elections than whites, that Catalans and Basques would be more critical of the performance of Spanish democracy than other compatriots, that Arabs would feel more powerless to influence Israeli politics than the Jewish population, and so on. Therefore the first core hypothesis is that within each country, ethnic majorities will express greater support than minorities for the political system. Support can be measured by attitudes towards the fairness of particular election outcomes, as well as more diffuse indicators such as satisfaction with democracy, political efficacy and voting turnout. Focusing on relative differences between groups within a country holds cross-national variations constant.

Based on this process, as a second step we can then examine relative differences in political support among majority and minority populations under different electoral systems. If consociational theories are correct in their assumptions, if ethnic minorities feel that the political system is fairer and more inclusive of their interests under proportional representation, then the second core hypothesis is that we would expect to find that these relative majority-minority differences would be smaller in countries with PR rather than majoritarian electoral rules. In contrast, if we find that the majority-minority gap in political support is as great under PR as under majoritarian systems, this would favor the null hypothesis.

6

Measuring the Primary Ethnic Cleavage

'Ethnicity' is one of the most complex and elusive terms to define and measure clearly. As mentioned earlier, ethnic identities are understood in this study as social constructs with deep cultural and psychological roots based on linguistic, ethnic, racial, regional, or religious backgrounds. They provide an affective sense of belonging and are socially defined in terms of their meaning for the actors. In Bulmer's words: "*An 'ethnic group' is a collectivity within a larger society, having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements which define the group's identity, such as kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance. Members of an ethnic group are conscious of belonging to the group.*"[30]

[Table 9.3 about here]

Table 9.3 shows the distribution of the ethnic minority populations in the countries under comparison. The ethno-national category classified respondents by their place of birth in all countries except for Britain, Spain, and the Czech Republic, where this was measured by residency in regions with strong national identities like Scotland and Catalonia. The ethno-racial category in the US and the Britain was based on racial self-identification. In the third category, the distribution of ethnic-linguistic minorities was measured according to the language usually spoken at home[31]. The linguistic cleavage produced the strongest divisions in the Ukraine which was equally divided between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking households, Taiwan where there were sizable minorities speaking Chinese Mandarin and Chinese Hakka, and Israel with its Arab population and Russian émigré groups, with Britain emerging as the most homogeneous population in its dominant language. Ethnic-religious minorities were measured by the respondent's religious identity, with this Australia, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Britain and the US the most heterogeneous, and Romania and Poland the most homogeneous, societies. It should be noted that this classification does not attempt to measure the strength of religiosity in the society, nor the 'distance' between religious faiths, for example between Jewish and Muslim, both of which would increase the intensity of religious differences. The last category taps the center-periphery cleavage classifying countries by the proportion in rural areas.

One consequence of their social construction is that the distinctions used to differentiate ethnic identities, and the political salience of ethnic cleavages, vary from one society to another. This greatly complicates the comparative analysis since we need to be sensitive to the particular conditions in each society, for example the role of race in the United States, regional-national divisions in Britain and Spain, or the critical importance of religion in Israel. The relevant cleavages based on divisions of ethnic identity, race, language, region, or religion varied in the different countries under comparison. After examining the distribution of different social cleavages in the societies under comparison, as a first step to simplify the patterns under comparison it was decided to focus the analysis in this study upon groups selected as the most politically salient majority-minority ethnic cleavage within each country (see Table 9.4). For consistent comparison the aim was to identify the functionally equivalent groups across nations. Groups were selected based on the broader literature on ethnic cleavages in the electorate in each country and also based on scrutiny of the strongest cleavages predicting political support in each nation included within the CSES data.

In three cases the primary ethnic cleavage was defined by language, namely Mandarin Chinese and Hakka speaking minorities in Taiwan; the Russian-speaking v. Ukrainian speaking populations in Ukraine; and the Hungarian-speaking population in Romania. In two cases this was defined by country of origin, namely the Maoris v. European populations in New Zealand and the Lithuanian v. Russian-Polish communities in Lithuania. In three cases the major cleavages was based on region, including the Basque, Galician and Catalan minorities in Spain; the Bohemian v. Moravian

communities in the Czech republic; and the Scots/Welsh v. English in Britain. Racial identities were used in the United States to distinguish the White v. African-American/Asian populations. In two nations, Poland and Australia, the main center-periphery cleavage was based on rural v. non-rural populations. Lastly, religion proved the primary cleavage distinguishing the Arab v. Jewish population in Israel. In some nations the cleavages were reinforcing, for example the Hungarian population in Romania and the Arabs in Israel proved distinctive in terms of their country of origin, language, and religion. In some other nations there were two distinct and independent types of ethnic cleavages, for example in Britain the main racial cleavage concerns the Asian and Afro-Caribbean minorities, estimated to be about 2.9% of the electorate, and the center-periphery cleavage dividing Scotland/Wales and England (see Table 9.3). The study excluded the separate scrutiny of single groups below 5% of the population where there were too few cases for reliable analysis. Subsequent research will develop this further by comparing majority-minority differences across the full range of ethnic identities.

System Support

What is the relative difference between the majority and minority populations using the four alternative indicators of system support? Table 9.4 shows the distribution of system support, the percentage difference between majority and minority groups ranked by size, and the significance of this difference, estimated using simple correlations without any controls. Where the difference is in a positive direction, this indicates that the minority proved more supportive than the majority. Where the difference is in a negative direction, this indicates the reverse.

In most cases the results confirm the first hypotheses, namely that where there were significant differences, the majority groups tended to prove consistently more positive towards the political system than minorities. In many cases the gap was substantively large, for example there was far greater dissatisfaction with democracy among the Catalans, Galicians and Basques in Spain, among the Hungarians in Romania, and among the Moravians in the Czech Republic. In five countries there was no significant difference in turnout, but in six countries levels of voting turnout were consistently lower for ethnic minorities such as among Arabs in Israel and the rural population in Poland. The only a few cases was there significant indicators of greater political support among minority than majority populations, notably assessments of electoral fairness in Israel and Spain, and also higher levels of political efficacy among minority populations in Taiwan and the Ukraine. If we compare all types of political support, it is apparent that compared with majority populations, minorities proved more positive on only four out of 47 indicators. In all the other cases the gap was either statistically insignificant, or minorities proved more critical of the political system.

[Table 9.4 about here]

The second proposition was that the majority-minority gap would be related to the type of electoral system that operated in each country. Consociational theory suggests that ethnic minorities would prove most critical of the political system where they are systematically excluded from power, due to a majoritarian electoral system. Yet the pattern established in Table 9.4 proves too complex to confirm this proposition. Evaluations of the fairness of elections can be regarded as the most direct support for the electoral system per se. On this indicator, it is apparent that the ethnic minority-majority gap is indeed reversed in Israel and Spain, both using PR. Nevertheless minorities under PR systems in Romania, New Zealand and Poland proved far more negative than majorities by this measure. In addition there was no consistent pattern across indicators. For example, when evaluating the performance of democracy in their country, understood as a more diffuse indicator of political support, minorities proved most critical in the PR nations of Spain, Romania, and the Czech Republic. Similarly mixed patterns, unrelated to the type of electoral system, were evident in terms of the majority-minority gaps on

political efficacy and voting turnout. The analysis demonstrates no simple and clear-cut picture relating the type of electoral system directly to differences in majority-minority political support. This evidence, favoring the null hypothesis, does not support the claims of consociation theory.

[Table 9.5 about here]

To examine this pattern further, a series of regression models were run in each country predicting levels of political support for majority-minority population, adding social controls for age, education, and income. A positive coefficient indicates that the majority populations were more supportive than minority populations. Insignificant coefficients indicate no difference between majority and minorities. A negative coefficient indicates that the minorities were more supportive than the majority. The results in Table 9.5 show few significant differences in minority political support in Australia, Britain and the United States, all with majoritarian electoral systems. The only exceptions were the Scots and Welsh who proved slightly more critical of the fairness of the election and of British democracy, a pattern that could be explained at least in part by the heightened salience of the issue of devolution in the 1997 general election. In the countries using mixed electoral systems, the ethnic minority groups tended to be less satisfied with democracy and less convinced about the fairness of the election outcomes. Out of eleven regression models, majorities were more positive than minorities in six models, and the reverse pattern was only evident in two. In the countries using PR, in the 24 separate regression models, where there was a significant majority-minority difference, minorities were more critical of the political system in 14 cases, and the pattern was only reversed in two cases (perceptions of electoral fairness in Israel and Spain, noted earlier). Across all indicators, the Maori population proved consistently more critical of their political system, as did the Hungarian population in Romania, and a similar pattern was evident on three indicators for the Catalan/Basque population in Spain. Therefore overall the evidence examined here fails to support the consociational claims, which have to be regarded as unproven by this analysis.

Conclusions and Discussion

The issue of the most effective institutional design for managing ethnic tensions has risen in salience in the last decade, along with attempts at democratic aid and state-building. The strategy in this chapter has been to compare relative levels of satisfaction with the political system among majority-minority populations to see whether the gap was reduced, or even reversed, under proportional PR party list systems, as consociational theory suggests. The findings indicate that there is a complex pattern at work here, and the claim that PR party list systems are directly associated with higher levels of political support among ethnic minorities is not confirmed by this study.

Yet it could be argued that perhaps the model within this study is too simple and there are a number of reasons why any relationship may be conditional and indirect. First, the territorial distribution of different ethnic minority groups varies considerably and, as Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova suggest, geography has a considerable impact on the working of electoral systems[32]. Some populations are clustered tightly in dense *networks* within particular geographic localities with distinct territorial boundaries, like the British Sikh and Bangladeshi communities in the center of Bradford, African-Americans living in inner city Detroit, or the French-speaking population in Montreal. Some are living in *mosaics* where two or more groups are so intermingled within a territory that it is impossible to identify boundaries, such as in Northern Ireland, the South Tyrol and the Balkans. Other *diasporas* are spread thinly over a wide area across the boundaries of many nation-states, notably the large Russian populations in the 'Near Abroad' such as in Ukraine and Lithuania, the Roma (gypsy) community in Central Europe, and the Kurdish population in the Middle East[33]. The geographic dispersion or concentration of support is particularly important for the way votes get translated into seats in elections that require winning a plurality of votes within a particular single member district, not across the

region or whole nation. In British general elections, for example, Plaid Cymru can win seats roughly proportional to their share of the vote, because of the heavy concentration of Welsh speakers in a few North Coastal Wales constituencies, but in contrast the more dispersed Liberal Democratic supporters are heavily penalized by First-Past-the-Post[34]. African-Americans concentrated in inner city districts can get many more House seats than minorities widely dispersed across legislative districts[35]. Territorial clustering allows homogeneous electoral districts representing different groups within heterogeneous societies.

Furthermore the way that the electoral system shapes ethnic representation can be expected to vary according to the degree of politicization and mobilization of ethnic populations into the political system, as well as in the type of cleavages, whether based on ethno-national, cultural-linguistic, ethnic-religious or racial identities. Some groups represent little more than a formal census categorization which may have little resonance for the common identity of particular groups, like 'Asians' in America bringing together émigrés from diverse cultures in India, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia and China; other share a single predominant cleavage, like Hispanic groups in the United States with a common language but drawn from diverse national and political backgrounds; whereas still others like African-Americans are bound together by communities based on their common experience of racial and social inequalities, and a shared historical heritage. As Lijphart points out, it is misleading to treat demographic classifications as equivalent to political divisions, for example to regard the Protestant-Catholic division in Northern Ireland as on a par to that in Switzerland[36]. Some societies are sharply segmented organizationally into separate sub-cultures, where groups have distinct political organizations, educational facilities, and cultural associations, while others integrate groups into the mainstream culture. Within the countries in this study, certain minorities find organizational expressing with parties such as the Hungarian Democratic Party in Romania, the (Arab) National Democratic Alliance in Israel, the Catalan Nationalist Party in Spain, the Scottish Nationalist Party in Britain, Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland, or the pro-mainland unification New Party in Taiwan[37]. Yet other distinct ethnic groups forward their issue agenda as broader coalitions within mainstream parties, like African-Americans and Hispanics within the Democratic Party. Ethnicity is a particularly difficult concept to operationalize and measure, and single-dimension indicators based on the number and size of ethnic groups in different countries are unsatisfactory unless we can also gauge the geographic distribution and degree of politicization of these groups[38]. As with conceptions of class differentials, there is an important distinction between objective indicators of group membership (such as formal religious affiliations), and subjective consciousness of the political saliency of these group identities (such as religious debates over reproductive rights). Consociational theory assumes that ethno-political identities are given and proportional electoral systems therefore serve to mobilize ethnic parties into the political system. Yet as argued in chapter 5, in the long-term there is probably a more complex process of interaction at work, whereby potential ethno-political identities are accommodated, but also mobilized and strengthened, by PR systems facilitating their organization and political expression through bonding parties.

Furthermore, majoritarian systems, even if they discriminate systematically against smaller parties, can still make special arrangements for minority representation. As discussed in the previous chapter, reserved seats for ethno-political minorities have been adopted in countries as diverse as Jordan (for Christians and Circassians), Pakistan (10 seats for non-Muslim minorities), New Zealand (for Maoris), Kurdistan (for Assyrians and Turkmens), Lebanon (for Maronites, Sunnis, Shiites, Greek Orthodox, Druses, Green Catholics and others groups), and Slovenia (for Hungarians and Italians)[39]. Another option is the over-representation in the seats allocated to certain districts or regions, to increase the election of minority groups. This practice is exemplified by the smaller size of the electoral quota used in Scottish constituencies, and affirmative gerrymandering (or redistricting) for African-Americans, Latinos and Asian

Americans in the United States[40]. As with positive action strategies for women, discussed earlier, legal statutes and party rules can regulate the selection of parliamentary candidates to ensure that minority candidates are chosen for single member districts or for party lists[41]. Lijphart acknowledges that majoritarian electoral systems can make special provision for the inclusion of certain specified ethnic or religious groups in parliament, but he argues that highly proportional electoral systems with low thresholds automatically minimize the barriers to office, which has the virtue of being seen as fairer than special provisions for special groups. "*PR has the great additional advantage of enabling any minority, not just those specifically favored by the electoral law, to be represented (as long as they attain a stipulated minimum level of electoral support). Compared with majoritarian systems, PR can be said to have the advantage of permitting representation by minorities that define themselves as groups wishing to have representation as minority parties. PR thus avoids any invidious choices in favor of certain minority groups and, as a consequence, against other minorities.*"[42] But the existence of alternative strategies implies that constitutional engineers could achieve minority parliamentary representation either through the choice of low threshold PR systems or through majoritarian systems with deliberate recognition of predetermined minority groups.

Lastly, the electoral system, while important, remains only one component in consociational systems of democracy. Other institutional arrangements can be expected to prove equally influential in shaping minority views of the political system, such as federal or decentralized designs for regional power-sharing, executive-legislative arrangements including single-party or multi-party coalitional governments, the adoption of parliamentary or presidential systems, and the division of powers between legislative houses, rigid constitutions protecting minority rights and subject to judicial review, and pluralist or corporatist interest group systems. Nevertheless consociational theory suggests that PR electoral systems combined with parliamentary government are the fundamental institutions upon from which many other arrangements flow.

Of course the evidence presented here remains limited, both in terms of the range of democracies included within the dataset and the way that ethnic minorities have been measured. If there is a relationship, it may well be one that is more complex and indirect, depending upon intermediary conditions such as the geographical clustering of ethnic minority populations, their levels of politicization as a group, and the relationships between ethnic identities, party systems and parliamentary representation. Special arrangements, like reserved seats for the aboriginal community in Taiwan or affirmative gerrymandering in the United States, can overcome some of the barriers facing minority groups within majoritarian electoral systems. We need to take account of how far ethnic minorities believe that they share a common identity with distinct political interests, and how far they believe parties within the existing power structure represent these interests. All these factors serve as intervening variables mediating the links between the electoral rules and how minorities perceive the political system. Understanding these issues is a major challenge before we can make any sweeping claims about electoral engineering. Nevertheless, given these important qualifications, the idea that more proportional electoral systems *directly* generate greater support for the political system among ethnic minority groups, as consociational theory claims, is not supported by these results.

Table 9.1: Major types of ethnic cleavages

Ethno-National	% Majority		% Minority Ethno-National Groups							
Czech Rep (ii)	Czech	94.9	Moravian	1.8	Roma	1.2	Other	2.1		
Romania (ii)	Romanian	92.0	Hungarian	5.6	Roma (Gypsy)	1.4	Other	1.0		
Britain (i)	English	85.7	Scottish	9.1	Welsh	5.2				
Lithuania (ii)	Lithuanian	85.2	Russian	6.9	Pole	5.8	Other	2.1		
New Zeal. (ii)	NZ European	81.6	Maori	14.4	Asian	1.4	Other	2.6		
Spain (i)	Others	78.9	Catalans	15.8	Pais Vasco (Basque)	5.3				
Australia (ii)	Australian	77.8	European	16.6	Asian	3.0	Other	2.6		
Taiwan (ii)	Min Nan	75.2	Hakka	11.5	Mainlanders	12.5	Other	0.8		
Ukraine (ii)	Ukrainian	72.4	Russian	24.6	Other	3.0				
Czech Rep (i)	Bohemians	62.4	Moravians	37.6						
Israel (ii)	Jewish-Israeli	54.5	Jewish-European	20.1	Arab	14.2	Jewish-Asia	6.0	Jewish-Africa	4.5
Ethno-Racial	**% Majority**		**% Minority Ethno-Racial Groups**							
Britain	White	97.1	Indian/Asian	1.6	Other	1.3				
US	White	86.2	African-American	11.2	Asian	1.4	Other	1.2		
Ethno-Linguistic (iii)	**% Majority**		**% Minority Ethno-Linguistic Groups**							
Britain	English	97.8	Other	2.2						
Romania	Romanian	93.6	Hungarian	5.0	Other	1.4				
New Zealand	English	84.9	Maori	9.1	Other	6.0				
Spain	Spanish	82.6	Catalan	10.6	Galician	5.4	Basque	1.4		
Israel	Hebrew	73.6	Arabic	15.0	Russian	10.9				
Taiwan	Min Nan	67.3	Mandarin	28.1	Hakka	4.3				
Ukraine	Russian	50.4	Ukrainian	49.6						
Ethno-Religious (iv)	**% Majority**		**% Minority Ethno-Religious Groups**							
Poland	Catholic	97.1	Other	2.9						
Romania	Orthodox	89.1	Protestant	6.3	Other	1.7				
Israel	Jewish	87.0	Muslim	9.6	Christian	2.2				
Taiwan	Confucianism	71.4	Buddhism	8.4	None	8.6	Taoism	6.8	I-Kuan-Tao	1.8
Ukraine	Orthodox	67.4	None	25.8						
US	Protestant	55.5	Catholic	25.2	None	12.4	Jewish	1.9		
Britain	Protestant	54.9	None	32.0	Catholic	10.9				
New Zealand	Protestant	47.6	Catholic	13.3	None	26.3	Other	12.8		
Czech Rep	Catholic	45.3	None	46.7	Protestant	3.8				
Australia	Protestant	43.5	Catholic	28.6	None	15.8				
Center-Periphery (v)	**% Majority**		**% Minority Rural Groups**							
Australia	Urban	76	Rural	24						
Poland	Urban	64	Rural	36						

Note: The figures represent the proportion of each group in the adult population (of voting age). Only groups over 1% are reported. Note that this survey was of the British electorate, not the UK, and therefore does not include respondents from Northern Ireland. (i) Based on standard regional classifications (ii) Based on place of birth. (iii) Ethnic-Linguistic cleavages are based on the main language spoken at home. (iv) Under religion, 'None' includes atheists and agnostics (v) Urban includes small town, suburbs or large town/city.

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-2002.

Table 9.2: Indicators of majority-minority political support

State	Major Cleavage	Minority	Majority	Diff.	Sig.	Primary minority group	ElecSys
Election Fair		*% Fair*	*% Fair*				
Israel	Religion	52	15	38	**	Arabs/Muslims	PR
Spain	Region	92	79	12	*	Catalans, Galicians, Basques	PR
Czech Rep	Region	83	80	3		Moravians	PR
US	Racial	74	76	-1		Non-Whites	Maj
Britain	Region	79	81	-3	*	Scots/Welsh	Maj
Poland	Center-Periphery	70	73	-4	*	Rural	PR
Taiwan	Linguistic	58	64	-6	*	Mandarin/Hakka	Mixed
Ukraine	Linguistic	33	41	-8	*	Russians	Mixed
New Zealand	Ethnicity	71	80	-9	**	Maoris	PR
Romania	Linguistic	72	82	-10	*	Hungarians	PR
Lithuania	Ethnicity	39	58	-20	**	Russians/Poles	Mixed
Satisfaction with Democracy		*% Satisfied*	*% Satisfied*				
Israel	Religion	58	53	5		Arabs/Muslims	PR
Lithuania	Ethnicity	34	35	-1		Russians/Poles	Mixed
Ukraine	Linguistic	9	10	-1		Russians	Mixed
Australia	Center-Periphery	72	80	-8	*	Rural	Maj
Britain	Region	69	78	-9	**	Scots/Welsh	Maj
Poland	Center-Periphery	57	66	-10	**	Rural	PR
New Zealand	Ethnicity	62	72	-10	**	Maoris	PR
US	Racial	72	82	-10	*	Non-Whites	Maj
Taiwan	Linguistic	40	51	-10	**	Mandarin/Hakka	Mixed
Spain	Region	48	64	-15	**	Catalans, Galacians, Basques	PR
Romania	Linguistic	28	45	-17	**	Hungarians	PR
Czech Rep	Region	42	62	-20	**	Moravians	PR
Political Efficacy		*% High*	*% High*				
Taiwan	Linguistic	60	49	11	**	Mandarin/Hakka	Mixed
Ukraine	Linguistic	80	75	6	*	Russians	Mixed
Britain	Region	76	76	0		Scots/Welsh	Maj
Israel	Religion	15	17	-2		Arabs/Muslims	PR
Australia	Center-Periphery	67	70	-3		Rural	Maj
Czech Rep	Region	81	86	-5		Moravians	PR
US	Racial	64	72	-8		Non-Whites	Maj
Poland	Center-Periphery	69	76	-8		Rural	PR
New Zealand	Ethnicity	70	79	-9	**	Maoris	PR
Romania	Linguistic	61	71	-10	*	Hungarians	PR
Lithuania	Ethnicity	57	68	-11	*	Russians/Poles	Mixed
Spain	Region	59	71	-11	*	Catalans, Galician's, Basques	PR
Voting Turnout (%)		*% Voted*	*% Voted*				
Romania	Linguistic	91	88	3		Hungarians	PR

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Australia	Center-Periphery	95	95	0	Rural	Maj
Britain	Region	82	83	-1	Scots/Welsh	Maj
Taiwan	Linguistic	91	92	-2	Mandarin/Hakka	Mixed
Czech Rep	Region	86	90	-4	Moravians	PR
New Zealand	Ethnicity	92	96	-4 **	Maoris	PR
Ukraine	Linguistic	74	80	-7 **	Russians	Mixed
US	Racial	68	78	-10 **	Non-Whites	Maj
Spain	Center-Periphery	80	90	-11 **	Catalans, Galacians, Basques	PR
Poland	Rural	51	61	-10 **	Rural	PR
Israel	Religion	67	86	-18 **	Arabs/Muslims	PR

Note: The difference represents the majority minus the minority. The significance of the difference between groups was tested with correlation coefficients. **=p.01 *=p.05.

Fairness of Election: Q2. "(PLEASE SEE CARD 1) *In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Thinking of the last election in [country], where would you place it on this scale of one to five where ONE means that the last election was conducted fairly and FIVE means that the last election was conducted unfairly?*" Percentage who believed election was fair (defined as categories 1 and 2).

Satisfaction with Democracy: Q1. "*On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?*" The figures represent the percentage 'very' or 'fairly' satisfied.

Political Efficacy: The 15-point political efficacy scale was constructed from the following items that were highly inter-correlated. 'High' efficacy was categorized as a total score of 8 or above.

Q11.   (PLEASE SEE CARD 5) " Some people say that members of [Congress / Parliament] know what ordinary people think. Others say that members of [Congress / Parliament] don't know much about what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that the members of [Congress/Parliament] know what ordinary people think, and FIVE means that the members of [Congress/Parliament] don't know much about what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?"

Q13.   (PLEASE SEE CARD 6) "Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say that it doesn't make a difference who is in power. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that it makes a difference who is in power and FIVE means that it doesn't make a difference who is in power), where would you place yourself?"

Q14.   (PLEASE SEE CARD 7) "Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a difference), where would you place yourself?"

Turnout: The question measured whether the respondent cast a ballot in the election. Functionally equivalent but not identical items were used in each national election survey.

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-2002

Table 9.3: Impact of majority-minority cleavage on political support, with social controls

	Main Cleavage		Electoral Fairness Beta	Sig	Democratic Satisfaction Beta	Sig	Political Efficacy Beta	Sig	Voting Turnout Beta	Sig
Australia	Center-Periphery	Rural	N/a		.035		.005		-.038	
Britain	Regional	Scots/Welsh	.041	**	.077	***	-.012		.000	
US	Racial	Non-White	-.027		.033		.013		.013	
Lithuania	Ethnic	Russian/Pole	.133	***	.027		.060	*	N/a	
Taiwan	Linguistic	Mandarin/Hakka	-.016		.061	*	-.061	*	.005	
Ukraine	Linguistic	Russian	.061	*	.060	*	-.057	*	.088	**
Czech Rep	Regional	Moravia	-.003		.110	***	.012		.007	
NZ	Racial	Maori	.079	***	.094	**	.075	***	.067	***
Israel	Religious	Muslim	-.295	***	.041		.053		.169	***
Poland	Center-Periphery	Rural	.027		.048	*	.013		.013	
Romania	Linguistic	Hungarian	.077	***	.095	***	.040	*	.092	**
Spain	Regional	Catalan/Basque	-.068	**	.071	***	.091	***	.123	***

Note: These figures represent standardized regression coefficients for the effects of majority-minority membership of the main ethnic group within each country on the four indicators of support for the political system after controlling for age (years), gender (0=female, 1=male), standardized household income (5-point scale) and education (8-point scale). All models use OLS regression except for turnout that uses logistic regression. For the scaling of the dependent variables see the footnotes to Tables 5. Significant positive coefficients indicate that majority populations are more supportive of the political system than minorities. Insignificant coefficients indicate that there is no difference between majority and minority populations. Negative coefficients indicate that the minority population is more supportive of the political system than majorities.
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-2002

[1] For a discussion of the concepts of ethnic and national identity, and ethnic conflict, see, for example, Benedict Anderson. 1996. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso; Michael Billig. 1995. *Banal Nationalism.* London: Sage; Earnest Gellner. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell; Michael Brown, Owen Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. 997. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; Raymond Taras and Rajat Ganguly. 1998. *Understanding Ethnic Conflict*. NY: Longman.

[2] Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, Eds. 1984. *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*. New York: Praeger; Arend Lijphart. 1984. *Democracies*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Arend Lijphart. 1986. 'Degrees of Proportionality of Proportional Representation Formulas.' In *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*. Ed. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart. New York: Agathon Press; Arend Lijphart. 1991. 'Constitutional Choices for New Democracies.' *Journal of Democracy* 2:72-84; Arend Lijphart. 1991. 'Proportional Representation: Double Checking the Evidence.' *Journal of Democracy* 2:42-48; Arend Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. New York: Oxford University Press; Arend Lijphart. 1995. 'Electoral Systems.' In *The Encyclopedia of Democracy*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press; Arend Lijphart. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

[3] See Giovanni Sartori. 1994. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry Into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes*. New York: Columbia University Press; Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman. 1996. *Institutional Design in New Democracies*. Boulder, Co: Westview.

[4] See, for example, Gary Cox. 1997. *Making Votes Count*. New York and London: Cambridge University Press; Richard Katz. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[5] Arend Lijphart. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Table 8.2 p.162.

[6] Arend Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. New York: Oxford University Press. Other secondary factors influencing this process include the basic electoral formula translating votes into seats (whether majoritarian, mixed, or proportional); the assembly size (the total number of seats in a legislature); linked lists or apparentement provisions; the ballot structure; and malapportionment (the size and distribution of the electorate within each constituency); and the difference between parliamentary and presidential systems

[7] Arend Lijphart. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven:Yale University Press. Figure 8.2 p.168.

[8] Richard Katz. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P.144-160.

[9] Arend Lijphart. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven:Yale University Press. P.33.

[10] Lijphart 1999 *Op Cit*, 280-282; see also Rein Taagepera 1994 who adopts a similar strategy. 'Beating the Law of Minority Attrition.' In Wilma Rule and Joseph Zimmerman. Eds. *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective*. Westport, CT: Greenwood. P.244.

[11] Pippa Norris. 1985 'Women in European Legislative Elites.' *West European Politics* 8(4): 90-101; Wilma Rule. 1994. 'Women's Underrepresentation and Electoral Systems.' *PS: Political Science and Politics* 4:689-692; Pippa Norris. 2000 'Women's Representation and Electoral Systems.' In *The International Encyclopedia of Elections*. Edited By Richard Rose. Washington, DC: CQ Press. (In press)

[12] Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Pippa Norris. Ed. 1997 *Passages To Power: Legislative Recruitment In Advanced Democracies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Pippa Norris. 1997 'Equality Strategies in the UK.' In *Sex Equality Policy in Western Europe* Edited by Frances Gardiner. London: Routledge. pp.46-59.

[13] See, however, Pippa Norris and Robert Mattes. 2003. 'Does ethnicity determine support for the governing party?' Afrobarometer Working Papers 26. http://www.afrobarometer.org/abseries.html

[14] The Gastil Index for these countries estimates that Malaysia can be classified as Party Free (4.5/7) and the Lebanon is Not Free (5.5/7). See the Freedom House Index of Freedom. www.freedomhouse.org.

[15] Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds. 1998. *Electoral Systems and Conflict Management in Africa*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press. See also Ben Reilly and Andrew Reynolds. 1998. *Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

[16] S.M. Saideman, D.J. Lanoue, M. Campenni, and S. Stanton. 2002. 'Democratization, political institutions, and ethnic conflict - A pooled time-series analysis, 1985-1998.' *Comparative Political Studies*. 35 (1): 103-129.

[17] See George Tsebelis. 1990. 'Elite Interaction and Constitution Building in Consociational Democracies.' *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. 2: 5-29.

[18] Joel Barkan. 1998. 'Rethinking the Applicability of Proportional Representation for Africa.' In *Electoral Systems and Conflict Management in Africa*. Ed. Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.

[19] Rein Taagepera. 1998. 'How electoral systems matter for democratization.' *Democratization*. 5(3): 68-91.

[20] See Pippa Norris. 1995. 'The Politics of Electoral Reform.' *International Political Science Review* Special Issue on Electoral Reform. 16(1): 65-78.

[21] Arend Lijphart. 1984. *Democracies*. New Haven: Yale University Press: 22-23.

[22] Donald L. Horowitz. 1991. *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society.* Berkeley: University of California Press; Donald L. Horowitz. 1993. 'Democracy in Divided Societies.' *Journal of Democracy* 4:18-38.

[23] Andre Blais and Ken Carty. 1990. 'Does Proportional Representation Foster Voting Turnout?' *European Journal of Political Research*. 18: 167-181.

[24] Robert B. Mattes and Amanda Gouws. 1999. 'Race, Ethnicity and Voting Behavior: Lessons from South Africa.' In *Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies*. Ed. Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. See also Ted Marr. 1993. 'Why Minorities Rebel - A Global Analysis Of Communal Mobilization and Conflict Since 1945.' *International Political Science Review* 14 (2): 161-201.

[25] Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction With Democracy.' *American Political Science Review* 91(1): 66-81.

[26] Pippa Norris. 1999. 'Institutional Explanations for Political Support.' In Pippa Norris. Ed. *Critical Citizens: Global Support For Democratic Governance.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Table 11.3. The social controls included age, gender, socioeconomic status and education.

[27] Susan A. Banducci, Todd Donovan and Jeffrey A. Karp. 1999. 'Proportional Representation and Attitudes about Politics: Results from New Zealand.' *Electoral Studies* 18 (4): 533-555.

[28] Pippa Norris. 1998. *Critical Citizens: Global Support For Democratic Governance.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[29] Pippa Norris. Ed. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support For Democratic Governance.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[30] Martin Bulmer. 1986. 'Race & Ethnicity.' In *Key Variables in Social Investigation*. Ed. Robert G. Burgess. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. In contrast 'race', based on how members of society

perceive group physical differences such as skin color, can be regarded as a sub-set of broader ethnic identities.

[31] It is unfortunate that the merged NES data does not appear to define the Hispanic population in the United States.

[32] Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova. 1994. 'Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude and the Number of Parties.' *American Journal of Political Science*. 38: 100-23. See also Donald Horowitz. 1991. *A Democratic South Africa?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[33] See Ian Budge, Kenneth Newton et al. 1997. *The Politics of the New Europe*. London: Longmans. Pp.106-107.

[34] Pippa Norris and Ivor Crewe. 1994. 'Did the British Marginals Vanish? Proportionality and Exaggeration in the British Electoral System Revisited.' *Electoral Studies* 13 (3): 201-221.

[35] Wilma Rule and Joseph Zimmerman, eds. 1994. *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities*. Westport: Greenwood.

[36] Arend Lijphart. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press. P.58.

[37] For a comparison of regional parties and their electoral strength in EU member states see Derek J. Hearl, Ian Budge and Bernard Pearson. 1996. 'Distinctiveness of Regional Voting: A Comparative Analysis Across the European Community (1979-1993).' *Electoral Studies* 15(2): 167-182.

[38] See, for example, the measure of the 'effective number of ethnic groups' used by Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova. 1994. 'Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude and the Number of Parties.' *American Journal of Political Science*. 38: 100-23. See also Octavia Amorim Neto and Gary W. Cox. 1997. 'Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures and the Number of Parties.' *American Journal of Political Science* 41(1): 149-74.

[39] Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly. Eds. 1997. *The International IDEA Handbook on Electoral System Design*. Stockholm: IDEA.

[40] Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson. Eds. 1992. *Controversies in Minority Voting*. Washington D.C.: Brookings; Amy, Douglas. 1993. *Real Choices: New Voices: The Case for PR Elections in the United States*. New York: Columbia University Press.

[41] Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris. Eds. 1993 *Gender and Party Politics*. London: Sage; Pippa Norris. Ed. 1997. *Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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[42] Arend Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. New York: Oxford University Press: 140.